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DECIPHERING WETLANDS  
JURISDICTION AFTER RAPANOS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, a multitude of appellate courts 
have debated the precise boundaries of the Army Corps of 
Engineers’ (“Corps”) jurisdiction to enforce the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”).1 This debate recently culminated with the Supreme 
Court addressing the issue of the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction 
for the third time in the CWA’s thirty-year history.2 In Rapanos 
v. United States, a split decision and the subject of this Note, 
the Supreme Court presented three tests for determining 
wetlands jurisdiction under the CWA, but no test commanded a 
majority of justices’ approval.3 This Note will argue that the 
Rapanos court should have applied the agency deference 
approach—upholding an agency’s construction of a statute so 
long as the construction was reasonable4—to determine the 
appropriateness of the Corps’ jurisdiction over the property at 
issue. This Note will further argue that all courts addressing 
the appropriateness of the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction should 
implement this approach. 
  
 1 See United States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 2004); In re 
Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 2003); Tracey v. Newdunn Assocs., LLP., 344 
F.3d 407, 408 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598, 600 (7th 
Cir. 2003); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 699 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Krilich, 303 F.3d 784, 785 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Interstate Gen. Co., No. 01-
4513, 2002 WL 1421411, at *1-2 (4th Cir. July 2, 2002); Rice v. Harken Exploration 
Co., 250 F.3d 264, 264 (5th Cir. 2001); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 
F.3d 526, 527 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 2 See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2208 (2006); Solid Waste 
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 159 
(2001). 
 3 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 
2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the courts on remand should reinstate the 
judgments if either the “significant nexus” or plurality test is met). 
 4 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984) (“[T]he question for the court is whether the agency’s [interpretation] is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.”). 
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The source of the Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands is 
the CWA. The CWA provides that the Corps may issue permits 
for the discharge of pollutants or fill material into “navigable 
waters,”5 and further defines “navigable waters” as “waters of 
the United States.”6 While Congress left “waters of the United 
States” undefined within the CWA, it evinced an intent that 
jurisdiction under the CWA be “the broadest constitutional 
interpretation.”7 In response, courts construed the definition of 
“navigable waters” broadly to include waters that are not 
actually navigable in the traditional sense.8 Under this logic, 
the Corps issued a regulation defining “waters of the United 
States” to include waters used in foreign or interstate 
commerce; all interstate waters and wetlands; intrastate lakes, 
rivers, and streams; tributaries;9 and wetlands adjacent to any 
of these waters (“adjacent wetlands”).10 Unlike other features 
  
 5 The statute reads: 
(a) Discharge into navigable waters at specified disposal sites.  
The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public 
hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable 
waters at specified disposal sites. Not later than the fifteenth day after the 
date an applicant submits all the information required to complete an 
application for a permit under this subsection, the Secretary shall publish the 
notice required by this subsection. 
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000). 
 6 “The term ‘navigable waters’ means the waters of the United States, 
including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000). 
 7 S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, at 3822.  
 8 See Int’l Paper Co. v. Oulette, 479 U.S. 481, 486 n.6 (1987). 
 9 The term “tributary” is left undefined by the Code of Federal Regulations 
and the CWA, but is generally understood to mean “[a] stream flowing directly or 
indirectly into [a body of water].” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1545 (8th ed. 2004). 
 10 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2006). For the purpose of this regulation,  
(a)  The term waters of the United States means 
(1)  All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be 
susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters 
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; 
(2)  All interstate waters including interstate wetlands; 
(3)  All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including inter-
mittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes . . . ; 
(4)  All impoundments of water otherwise defined as waters of the United 
States under the definition;  
(5)  Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this 
section; 
(6)  The territorial seas; 
(7)  Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves 
wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) of this section.  
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mentioned in this regulation, wetlands are constantly changing 
eco-systems, which may be wet for only part of the year.11 
Therefore, some wetlands are difficult to designate as within 
the Corps’ jurisdiction because these wetlands may not be 
adjacent to another “water of the United States” for an entire 
year.12 
In Rapanos, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth 
Circuit’s decisions in two consolidated cases that had upheld 
the Corps’ jurisdiction to deny permits to two parties wishing 
to build on privately owned wetlands.13 The plurality decision 
to remand the case produced three conflicting positions for 
assessing the Corps’ right to regulate private wetlands and, 
thus, the propriety of the Corps’ definition of “waters of the 
United States.”14 First, in the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia 
limited his interpretation of “waters of the United States” to 
waters that are relatively permanent, standing, or flowing 
bodies, and restricted adjacent wetlands covered by the CWA to 
those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to “waters 
of the United States.”15 Second, Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion proposed that a significant nexus must be satisfied 
  
33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2006). 
 11 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, What Are Wetlands?, 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/vital/what.html [hereinafter What Are Wetlands?]. 
Wetlands are a vanishing element of the global ecological community yet the definition 
of wetlands is so technical that reasonable minds differ on what it is they wish to 
protect. One legal definition of wetlands requires soil covered by water for all or part of 
the year. Wetlands, however, cannot be determined through a legal test, as these 
features are eco-systems, which are more extensive than their component parts. Like 
coral reefs and rainforests, wetlands support a variety of plant and animal life forms. 
Both aquatic and terrestrial creatures live on wetlands depending upon whether the 
region consists of coastal or inland wetlands. Id. Skeptics who refer to wetlands as 
isolated, disease-ridden swamps overlook their value in contributing water 
purification, water storage, flood prevention, erosion control, timber production, 
recreation, and several other natural products to the surrounding environment and 
human society. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Wetlands and People, 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/vital/people.html. 
  Wetlands vary tremendously between coastal and inland regions. Coastal 
regions often consist of a mix between salt and fresh water and are located on the 
Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts. What Are Wetlands?, supra. Many parts of these 
regions are unvegetated because the salt water extinguishes the lives of the plants. On 
the other hand, inland wetlands are almost entirely freshwater and are located near 
moving bodies of water on floodplains. These wetlands frequently involve groundwater 
or precipitation reaching the surface on a seasonal basis. In some cases, the ground 
may be wet for only a few months per year. Id. 
 12 What Are Wetlands?, supra note 11. 
 13 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2235. 
 14 See id. at 2215, 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 2252 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 15 Id. at 2221, 2226.  
340 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1  
between the wetlands at issue and navigable-in-fact waters to 
confer jurisdiction under the CWA, and provided several 
factors for determining which wetlands had this nexus.16 
Finally, Justice Stevens—joined by three dissenting justices—
advocated deference to the Corps’ jurisdiction, so long as its 
interpretation of the CWA was reasonable.17 In response to 
Rapanos, several courts have applied Kennedy’s significant 
nexus test with reservation.18 A few courts have declared this 
test too ambiguous, and have chosen instead to use their own 
precedent on a case-by-case basis.19 As a result, the precise 
boundaries of the Corps’ jurisdiction under the CWA remain 
unclear.20 
This Note will argue that Justice Stevens’ agency 
deference approach provides the correct standard for 
examining the Corps’ jurisdiction under the CWA and that the 
plurality and significant nexus tests advocated in Rapanos by 
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, respectively, inappropriately 
impose unnecessary judicial constraints on the Corps. While 
the plurality test provides a plausible definition of the phrase 
“waters of the United States,” this definition fails to recognize 
the Corps’ administrative role in construing the statute, the 
CWA’s thirty-year history of legislative and judicial precedent, 
and the harmful effects that this definition would impose on 
the environment through its practice. The significant nexus 
test, in contrast, recognizes the importance of the CWA’s 
thirty-year history and purpose of environmental protection, 
but the concept of a “significant nexus” in practice would lead 
to disparate outcomes and uncertainty for private property 
  
 16 Id. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring). “Navigable in fact” refers to waters 
considered navigable in the traditional sense of capability for interstate commerce. The 
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870). The factors suggested by Kennedy consisted of 
“the statute’s goals and purposes. . . . [o ‘restore and maintain the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.’” Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000)). 
 17 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2252 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 18 United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2006); N. Cal. River 
Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007), superseding 457 
F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cundiff, 480 F. Supp. 2d 940, 943 (W.D. Ky. 
2007); United States v. Fabian, No. 2:02-CV-495, 2007 WL 1035078, at *14-15 (N.D. 
Ind. Mar. 29, 2007); Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 824 
(N.D. Cal. 2007); United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, 
at *20-21 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2006). 
 19 E.g., United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 
(N.D. Tex. 2006); see also United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724-25 
(7th Cir. 2006) (discussing the limitations of applying Rapanos). 
 20 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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owners and the government. Unlike these two previous tests, 
the agency deference approach allows the Corps to further the 
purposes and history of the CWA within its discretion and 
provides for courts to intervene to enjoin an unreasonable 
construction. In suggesting that the Rapanos Court reached an 
improper result, this Note argues that agency deference should 
be applied to the Corps’ jurisdiction over the property at issue 
in that case, and, by extension, to all cases concerning the 
Corps’ ability to regulate wetlands regardless of the presence or 
absence of any surface connection to “waters of the United 
States.” 
Part II will describe the history behind the CWA and its 
deference to the Corps on rule-making. Part III will then 
demonstrate that the reasoning embodied in the plurality test 
is not only flawed and strained, but also inconsistent with prior 
Supreme Court precedent, CWA legislative history, and the 
purposes of environmental protection behind the CWA. Next, 
Part IV will contend that the significant nexus test 
misinterprets relevant precedent and thwarts the interests of 
both private property owners and the government. Finally, 
Part V will argue that the agency deference position correctly 
provides reasonable boundaries to the Corps’ jurisdiction 
because the CWA’s structure, purpose, and thirty-year history 
of jurisprudence—along with the strong policies of 
administrative efficiency, economic concerns, and 
environmental protection—trump the whims of individual 
property owners.  
II. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE WETLANDS  
JURISDICTION ISSUE 
A. The Clean Water Act 
In 1972, Congress passed the CWA after a disastrous 
pair of decades.21 Over the previous twenty years, Congress had 
left water pollution regulation mostly to the states, and the 
states had failed to adequately enforce any uniform policy 
against interstate water pollution.22 This local experiment 
  
 21 S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 1-2 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 
3672.  
 22 Id. The states actually had full power over enforcement until 1956, when 
Congress authorized federal grants to be issued for pollution control and to help build 
treatment plants. Id. This federal assistance through grants could not adequately 
satisfy the needs of states, so Congress attempted to provide more federal support by 
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resulted in several environmental disasters of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, which garnered national and congressional 
attention.23 In response, Congress enacted the CWA.24 Through 
the CWA, Congress sought to ameliorate concerns of future 
disasters by attempting “to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”25 As 
the Supreme Court recognized, Congress saw the need for the 
federal government to regulate water pollution because it 
believed controlling the discharge of toxins into water at the 
source would prevent them from traveling great distances 
through the natural water system.26  
  
creating a new federal agency in 1966 and adopting amendments in 1970 to add new 
areas of federal liability. Id. at 1, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3669-70. 
 23 The most famous of these events was the Cuyahoga River catching fire due 
to excessive pollution in 1969, discussed infra note 25. EPA, A BENEFITS ASSESSMENT 
OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAMS SINCE 1972, 1-2 (2000), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eermfile.nsf/Attachment+Names/EE-0429-01.pdf/$File/EE 
-0429-01.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter BENEFITS ASSESSMENT]. In addition, a 1971 
senate report noted that there was only one litigated case in the previous twenty years 
under the abatement procedure of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. See S. REP. 
NO. 92-414, at 5 (1971); as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3672. In that case, 
more than four years elapsed between the initial conference and the consent decree, 
while more than five million tons of raw sewage was being dumped into a midwestern 
city’s river each day. Id. 
   In 1970, the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution spent 
fourteen days conducting public hearings on water pollution abatement and control. 
S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 3-4 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3670. These 
hearings culminated in eighteen Senate bills on water pollution, four of which 
recommended amendments to the current law on construction grants, standard setting, 
and enforcement. The Subcommittee, however, was too busy in 1970 developing the 
Clean Air Act, so the actual drafting of the CWA was postponed until the 95th 
Congress could take up the issue. BENEFITS ASSESSMENT, supra, at 1-1, 1-2. 
 24 See What Are Wetlands?, supra note 11. 
 25 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). In addition, the CWA’s passage in 1972 evidenced a 
broad purpose to reduce and eliminate pollution, create a new federal regime to 
supplant the state administration system, and respond to several environmental 
events garnering public attention. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2265 (Stevens J., dissenting) 
(citing BENEFITS ASSESSMENT, supra note 23). The EPA’s assessment discusses the 
act’s provision regarding elimination of pollution discharges by 1985, and it cites the 
improvements along the Cuyahoga River as benefits reversing the trend of 
industrialization that led to the river catching fire in 1969. Id. at 1-1, 1-2. 
 26 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985) 
(citing S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 1-2 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,  
3742) (“Water moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants 
be controlled at the source.”). The hydrologic cycle, also known as the  
water cycle, generally “describes the continuous movement of water on, above, and 
below the surface of the Earth.” U.S. Geological Survey, The Water Cycle, 
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/watercycle.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). As this term 
describes a literal cycle, it refers to water in all three of its states: liquid, vapor, and 
ice. Id. 
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B. The Army Corps of Engineers and the Clean Water Act 
The Corps’ enforcement of the CWA profoundly reversed 
a progressive loss of wetlands. At the time Congress enacted 
the CWA, annual wetlands loss was about 500,000 acres per 
year.27 Since that time, the annual wetlands loss has become a 
slight annual gain in recent years.28 The Corps accomplished 
this reversal through Section 404 of the CWA.29 The Section 
404 program requires property owners to obtain a permit from 
the Corps if they plan to carry out activities involving disposal 
of dredged or fill materials into “waters of the United States.”30 
While the EPA and other agencies31 play different roles in the 
Section 404 program, the Corps is the sole administrative 
agency with jurisdiction to issue permits.32 The Corps broadly 
  
 27 JEFFREY A. ZINN & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CRS REP. NO. RL33483, 
WETLANDS: AN OVERVIEW OF ISSUES, at 5 (June 20, 2006) (on file with author), updated 
version available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/crs/abstract.cfm?NLEid=1647 (July 26, 
2007) [hereinafter ZINN & COPELAND I]. When European explorers landed in North 
America in the seventeenth century, over 220 million acres of wetlands existed in the 
lower forty-eight states. Id.; see also EPA, Wetlands: Status and Trends, 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/vital/status.html. Three centuries later, less than 
fifty percent of these lands remained. Id. 
 28 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) estimates this annual gain to 
be about 32,000 acres per year between 1998 and 2004. ZINN & COPELAND I, supra note 
27. Several environmentalists, however, dispute the gains in acreage as flawed data 
representing the expansion and development of small private ponds, instead of natural 
wetlands. Id. The FWS estimates 105.5 million acres remain in the forty-eight 
contiguous states. Alaska currently encompasses an additional estimated 170-200 
million acres of wetlands. EPA, Wetlands: Status and Trends, supra note 27. Louisiana 
suffers 80% of the total loss of coastal wetlands in the United States and has recently 
become a focus of potentially $14 billion in wetlands restoration legislation proposed 
since the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. JEFFREY A. ZINN & CLAUDIA COPELAND, 
CRS ISSUE BRIEF NO. IB97014, WETLAND ISSUES (Aug. 7, 2001), available at 
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Wetlands/wet-5.cfm [hereinafter ZINN & 
COPELAND II]. The Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act, introduced by United States 
Senator Mary Landrieu of Louisiana, would provide revenues from new oil and gas 
production in the Gulf of Mexico in part to benefit coastal restoration along the 
shorelines of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas. N.Y. Times Reverses Stand 
on LA’s Sen. Mary Landrieu Oil Royalty Bill, NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, Oct. 30, 
2006.  
 29 ZINN & COPELAND I, supra note 27, at 6. 
 30 Id. “Waters of the United States” refers to the terms of 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), 
which defines “navigable waters” as “waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). 
The Corps’ authority to regulate dredging and filling derives from and relates back to 
its jurisdiction to enforce the River and Harbors Act of 1899. ZINN & COPELAND I, supra 
note 27, at 6. If a state’s governor wishes the state to implement its own permit 
program in lieu of the Corps’, the governor must submit to the Administrator of the 
EPA a description of the proposed state program. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1). 
 31 Most notably, the FWS, the Natural Resources Conservation Service, and 
the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) also administer portions of Section 
404. ZINN & COPELAND I, supra note 27, at 6. 
 32 Id. 
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defines this jurisdiction to include waters used in foreign or 
interstate commerce; all interstate waters and wetlands; 
intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams; tributaries;33 and 
wetlands adjacent to any of these waters.34 Congress’ 
subsequent refusal to amend the CWA suggests its intent for 
the Corps’ jurisdiction to remain broad.35 
C. The Congressional Acquiescence of 1977 
In 1977, Congress considered amending the CWA 
because critics of the Section 404 program had claimed that the 
Corps overreached its authority to regulate wetlands not 
“navigable-in-fact.”36 In the House, the Committee on Public 
Works and Transportation reported a bill that limited the 
Corps’ jurisdiction to navigable-in-fact waters.37 By contrast, 
the Senate bill out of committee38 included only minor specific 
exemptions from the Corps’ authority with no direct limit on 
jurisdiction.39 Ultimately, after much debate, the Joint 
Conference Committee acquiesced and allowed the broader 
  
 33 The term “tributaries” is left undefined by the regulations and the CWA, 
but “tributaries” is generally understood to mean “a stream flowing into [a body of 
water].” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1545 (8th ed. 2004). 
 34 33 C.F.R. § 328.3. For the relevant text, see supra note 10. 
 35 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 36 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 135-36 (1985) 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-139, at 1-2 (1977)). Many of these critics were actually from 
farm, forestry, and land development groups that pressured Congress to amend the 
CWA so that they would not have to apply to the Corps for permits to develop certain 
types of lands. See, e.g., United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 729, 729-30 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Alexander, 511 F. Supp. 278, 288 (W.D. La. 
1981). 
  “Navigable-in-fact” refers to waters considered navigable in the traditional 
sense of capability for interstate commerce. Once, the standard for wetlands 
jurisdiction depended on whether a body of water was “navigable-in-fact.” The Daniel 
Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870) (“Those rivers must be regarded as navigable rivers in law 
which are navigable in fact.”) The Daniel Ball court further held that “navigable in 
fact” waters were those capable of being used as “highways for commerce, over which 
trade and travel are or may be conducted.” Id. When the focus of environmental 
regulation changed from promoting navigability to reducing pollutants, however, the 
navigability requirement was dropped with the creation of the CWA. ZINN & COPELAND 
I, supra note 27, at 6. 
 37 H.R. 3199, 95th Cong., at 80-81, 102-04 (1977) (cited in Riverside Bayview, 
474 U.S. at 136). 
 38 The Senate committee reporting this legislation was the Senate Committee 
on Environment and Public Works. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 136. 
 39 See generally S. 1952, 95th Cong., at 63-76 (1977) (cited in Riverside 
Bayview, 474 U.S. at 136). In the Senate, the narrow House definition was defeated in 
favor of the older definition. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 136-37. 
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construction of “navigable waters” to endure.40 Since this 
acquiescence, Congress has not reconsidered limiting the 
Corps’ jurisdiction.41 
D. The History of Agency Deference 
If a party challenges the Corps’ jurisdiction, courts 
traditionally use agency deference as the standard of review. 
This standard derives from Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council.42 Under the agency deference approach, also 
known as Chevron deference, a court must first ask if Congress 
has expressed its intent on the issue.43 If Congress’ intent  
is not clear, the court should not try to create its own 
interpretation of the statute.44 Instead, the court must 
determine whether the agency’s construction of the statute was 
reasonable.45 Since Chevron, courts have utilized agency 
deference to resolve countless issues relating to administrative 
agencies’ jurisdiction.46 Thus, courts have typically used agency 
  
 40 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 136-37. Senator Baker even remarked that 
the CWA “retain[ed] the comprehensive jurisdiction over the Nation’s waters exercised 
in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act.” Id. (citing 123 CONG. REC. 39209 
(1977)); see also 123 CONG. REC. 38950-39210. The CWA is also known as the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act. Brian Knutsen, Asserting Clean Water Act Jurisdiction 
Over Isolated Waters: What Happens After the SWANCC Decision, 10 ALB. L. ENVTL. 
OUTLOOK 155, 157 (2005). 
 41 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), 1362(7) (2000); see also 33 C.F.R. 328.3 (2006). 
 42 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In 
Chevron, the large oil company sought review of a D.C. Circuit decision that upheld a 
Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) challenge to the EPA regulations of the 
Clean Air Act. Id. at 844. In a 6-0 decision, the Supreme Court held the EPA 
regulations should be upheld as a permissible construction of the Clean Air Act. Id. at 
866. 
 43 “First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43. 
 44 “If . . . the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.” Id. 
at 843. 
 45 “Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.” Id. 
 46 See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n. v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985); Train v. NRDC, 
421 U.S. 60, 75, 87 (1975); Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. County Comm’rs of Carroll County, 
Md., 268 F.3d 255, 267 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 729 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  
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deference as the standard to resolve issues regarding the 
Corps’ and the EPA’s jurisdiction.47 
E. Pre-Rapanos Jurisprudence 
Between the congressional acquiescence in 1977 and the 
Rapanos decision, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
the Corps’ jurisdiction twice: in United States v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes (“Riverside Bayview”)48 and in Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps 
of Engineers (“SWANCC”).49 In Riverside Bayview, the Corps 
sought to enjoin the filling of property on what the Corps’ own 
regulation defined as an “adjacent wetland.”50 The Sixth Circuit 
narrowly construed the Corps’ jurisdiction over adjacent 
wetlands to exclude “wetlands that were not subject to flooding 
by adjacent navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to 
support the growth of aquatic vegetation.”51 Reversing the 
Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court used agency deference to hold 
that the legislative history and environmental policy behind 
the CWA commanded a broad interpretation of the Corps’ 
powers.52 The Riverside Bayview Court did not attempt to 
  
 47 “Accordingly, our review is limited to the question whether it is reasonable, 
in light of the language, policies, and legislative history of the Act for the Corps to 
exercise jurisdiction over [adjacent wetlands].” United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985). 
This view of the agency charged with administering the statute is entitled to 
considerable deference; and to sustain it, we need not find that it is the only 
permissible construction that EPA might have adopted but only that EPA’s 
understanding of this very ‘complex statute’ is a sufficiently rational one to 
preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of EPA. 
Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125. 
 48 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 126. 
 49 SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 176-77 (2001). 
 50 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 124. The Corps’ regulation provided “[t]he 
term ‘wetlands’ means those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or 
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal 
circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in 
saturated soil conditions.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1978). The Corps had sued a developer 
in District Court to enjoin its construction of a housing development on wetlands, 
which were inundated with ground water. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 124, 130-31. 
The District Court had granted the relief sought by the Corps, but the Sixth Circuit 
reversed, and the Corps petitioned the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 125. 
 51 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 125. The Sixth Circuit’s holding that a 
narrow construction must apply to the Corps’ authority under the CWA to avoid a 
regulatory taking was quickly dismissed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 126-27. 
 52 Id. at 132-33. 
Faced with such a problem of defining the bounds of its regulatory authority, 
an agency may appropriately look to the legislative history and underlying 
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construe the CWA or determine whether the Corps’ regulation 
was the most beneficial means of enforcing the CWA’s 
purposes.53 Instead, the Court recognized that the Corps’ 
definition of adjacent wetlands was reasonable, and held that 
therefore it was improper to subject the issue to further judicial 
scrutiny.54 
In SWANCC, the Court denied the Corps’ wetlands 
jurisdiction for the first time in the CWA’s history.55 The Corps 
had enacted the Migratory Bird Rule,56 a regulation that 
extended the Corps’ jurisdiction over “navigable waters” to 
include all habitats of migratory birds in intrastate waters.57 
When a state commission informed the Corps that a proposed 
disposal site for solid waste was also the nesting site for 121 
bird species, the Corps forbade any development on the site 
claiming that a group of abandoned gravel mining depressions 
constituted “waters of the United States.”58 In affirming the 
Corps’ jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit noted the Corps’ 
authority under the CWA to regulate any waters within the 
scope of the Commerce Clause and concluded that the site at 
  
policies of its statutory grants of authority. Neither of these sources provides 
unambiguous guidance for the Corps in this case, but together they do 
support the reasonableness of the Corps’ approach . . . .  
Id. at 132. 
  The Court went on to note that Congress recognized broad federal 
authority in enacting the CWA and defining “waters of the United States.” Id. at 133. 
Further, the Court mentioned the congressional concern for water quality, and noted 
the weight of the Corps’ ecological judgment, as an expert agency in the field. Id. at 
133-34. Finally, the Court discussed the 1977 congressional acquiescence and 
amendment of the CWA to show that “Congress expressly stated that the term ‘waters’ 
included adjacent wetlands.” Id. at 136-39. 
 53 See id. at 138-39. 
 54 Id., 474 U.S. at 139 (“We are thus persuaded that the language, policies, 
and history of the [CWA] compel a finding that the Corps has acted reasonably in 
interpreting the Act . . . .” ). 
 55 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 170-71. 
 56 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 
41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986). 
 57 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164-65. 
 58 Id. at 164. The Court noted: 
[T]he Corps formally ‘determined that the seasonally ponded, abandoned 
gravel mining depressions located on the project site, while not wetlands, did 
qualify as “waters of the United States” . . . based upon the following criteria: 
(1) the proposed site had been abandoned as a gravel mining operation; (2) 
the water areas and spoil piles had developed a natural character; and (3) the 
water areas are used as habitat by migratory bird [sic] which cross state 
lines.’  
Id. at 164-65.  
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issue fell within these bounds.59 The Supreme Court reversed.60 
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist held that the 
gravel mining depressions at issue were not “navigable waters” 
or adjacent wetlands, but failed to settle on one definition for 
the critical link needed to classify wetlands as “waters of the 
United States.”61 In response to the Corps’ argument for agency 
deference, the SWANCC Court held that this approach was 
inapplicable when an administrative interpretation reached 
the limits of Congress’ power.62 Rehnquist also reasoned that 
the 1977 congressional acquiescence63 did not apply to 
“nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters” because this 
acquiescence resulted from a concern for wetlands 
preservation, not a concern for migratory birds, and occurred 
nearly ten years before the Corps issued the Migratory Bird 
Rule.64 Thus, the SWANCC Court held that the land at issue 
was not subject to the Corps’ jurisdiction because of its isolated, 
intrastate, and non-navigable nature.65 
  
 59 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 166. The Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution states, “The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3. The 
Supreme Court has held this clause gives Congress the expansive power to pass 
legislation regulating any commerce that is “interstate” in nature. See Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Between 1937 and 1995, the Supreme Court failed 
to declare any federal law unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’ scope under the 
Commerce Clause. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES § 3.3, at 239 (2d ed. 2002). The Rehnquist Court, however, twice employed the 
Commerce Clause to strike down two federal laws as unconstitutional. See United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act); United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Gun Free School Zones Act). Under Lopez and Morrison, 
Congress may regulate (1) the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce, 
and (3) activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. 
 60 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. 
 61 Id. Rehnquist described the requisite link in different parts of the opinion 
as “wetlands ‘inseparably bound up with the “waters” of the Unites States,’” “wetlands 
that actually abutted on a navigable waterway,” and wetlands possessing a “significant 
nexus” with navigable-in-fact waters. Id. at 165-67. 
 62 “Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer 
limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that 
result.” Id. at 172. 
 63 This term refers to Congress’ failure to amend the Corps’ jurisdiction with 
a proposed amendment in 1977. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 
U.S. 121, 136-39 (1985); see also supra Part II.C. 
 64 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 170-71. 
 65 Id. at 171-72. After SWANCC and before Rapanos, most appellate courts 
limited SWANCC’s holding to waters that were isolated, intrastate, and non-navigable. 
Robert R.M. Verchick, Toward Normative Rules for Agency Interpretation: Defining 
Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 845, 866 (2004) (“Several 
federal courts have now examined the impact of SWANCC on Clean Water Act 
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F.  The Rapanos Decision 
The Rapanos Court issued the Supreme Court’s third 
decision on the scope of the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction in the 
CWA’s thirty-year history.66 The opinion consolidated the 
appeals of two Sixth Circuit decisions, Rapanos v. United 
States67 and Carabell v. United States,68 which involved 
disputes between two property owners and the Corps over the 
denial of permits to develop four plots of land.69 Each of the four 
plots at issue contained wetlands and some connection to a 
river or tributary of another body of water.70 
Rapanos, a real estate developer, initiated construction 
on wetlands at the various sites without applying to the Corps 
for permits.71 Despite receiving several administrative 
compliance orders from the EPA directing him to cease work 
immediately, Rapanos continued to build on the sites and 
performed extensive clearing and filling activities at these 
locations.72 The United States brought criminal and civil 
actions against Rapanos for illegally discharging fill material 
into protected wetlands under the CWA, failing to respond to 
requests for information, and ignoring the administrative 
compliance orders.73 After a bench trial, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found that 
Rapanos filled twenty-two acres of wetlands in violation of 33 
  
jurisdiction. Most of these cases limit SWANCC’s effect to waters that are isolated, 
intrastate, and non-navigable, although a few do not.”). 
 66 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208.  
 67 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2208. 
 68 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208. 
 69 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2238-39 (Roberts, CJ., concurring). In Rapanos, four 
pieces of land were at issue: (1) a plot of 230 acres, known as the Salzburg site, 
including 28 acres of wetlands; (2) a plot of 275 acres, known as the Hines Road site, 
including 64 acres of wetlands; (3) a plot of 200 acres, known as the Pine River site, 
with 49 acres of wetlands; and (4) a parcel of 19.6 acres, the Carabell site, including 
15.9 acres of wetlands. Id. 
 70 Id. at 2239. The District Court found that the Salzburg site had a surface 
water connection to “tributaries of the Kawkawlin River which, in turn, flows into the 
Saginaw River and ultimately into Lake Huron.” Id. The Hines Road site connected to 
a drain that carried water into the Tittabawassee River, while the Pine River site’s 
wetlands connected through surface water to the Pine River and also flowed into Lake 
Huron. Id. In Carabell, the property was separated by a man-made berm from a ditch 
that connected to a drain which empties into a creek that empties into Lake St. Clair. 
Carabell v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 2d 917, 923 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
 71 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2253. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 2239 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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U.S.C. §1311.74 Rapanos subsequently appealed to the Sixth 
Circuit, which affirmed the findings of the District Court on the 
grounds that Rapanos filled lands that contained “adjacent 
waterways” to “navigable waters.”75 
Unlike Rapanos, the Carabells apparently did not 
attempt to develop their lands.76 The Carabells twice applied 
for a permit to build condominium units on their land between 
1993 and 1994.77 Upon the Corps’ second denial, the Carabells 
brought an administrative appeal to the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.78 The District Court 
found that the Corps was within its jurisdiction to deny the 
permit and was not arbitrary and capricious in doing so, and 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed.79 
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit on both 
cases and remanded to the District Court.80 However, the Court 
was divided on the proper test to be applied. Four justices 
(Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Roberts) agreed that “waters of the 
United States” should be limited in application to “only 
relatively permanent, standing, or flowing bodies of water” and 
that only wetlands with a continuous surface connection to 
“waters of the United States” may be classified as adjacent 
wetlands.81 Four justices (Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and 
Ginsburg) agreed that the Court should have deferred to the 
Corps’ jurisdiction as an executive agency with a broad 
congressional delegation of authority.82 In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Kennedy argued that the case should be remanded on 
the grounds that neither the plurality nor the dissent applied a 
  
 74 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This conclusion was 
based largely on the “highly credible” testimony of Dr. Daniel Willard, an expert in 
wetlands whom the District Court found to be “eminently qualified.” Rapanos, 376 F.3d 
at 644 (“The district court found Dr. Willard to be ‘eminently qualified’ as an expert in 
wetlands and concluded that his testimony was ‘highly credible.’”). 
 75 Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 639. The Court of Appeals pointed out that “adjacent 
waterways” include any branch of a tributary system that eventually flows into a 
navigable body of water. Id. 
 76 See Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 257 F. Supp. 2d 917, 920-23 
(E.D. Mich. 2003), aff’d, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), rev’d, Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 
2208. 
 77 Id. at 919. 
 78 Id. at 921. 
 79 Id. at 933-34; Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 704, 710 
(6th Cir. 2004). 
 80 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2208. 
 81 Id. at 2221, 2226. 
 82 Id. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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significant nexus test.83 According to Kennedy, wetlands have a 
“significant nexus” when they, alone or in combination with 
nearby lands, “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity” of navigable-in-fact waters.84 Courts must 
then assess the significant nexus in terms of the CWA’s goals 
and purposes to determine whether the wetlands are “waters of 
the United States.”85 
G. Cases Since Rapanos 
Since Rapanos, courts have disagreed over the proper 
test to apply.86 Some courts have chosen to apply the significant 
nexus test as the narrowest grounds to follow Rapanos.87 Other 
courts have held that the Corps has wetlands jurisdiction if the 
wetlands at issue satisfy either the plurality or significant 
nexus tests.88 Finally, a few courts have disregarded the 
  
 83 Id. at 2250 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 84 Id. at 2248. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 
2006); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 
2007), superseding 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 
56, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2006). United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 
613 (N.D. Tex. 2006).  
 87 See S.F. Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div., 481 F.3d 700, 707-08 (9th Cir. 
2007); N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999-1000; Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 725; 
United States v. Fabian, No. 2:02-CV-495, 2007 WL 1035078, at *15 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 
29, 2007); Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 824 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007). These courts follow the precedent of Marks v. United States, which states, 
“[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 88 See Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63-64; United States v. Cundiff, 480 F. Supp. 2d 
940, 944 (W.D. Ky. 2007); Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc’y v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F. 
Supp. 2d 219, 226-27 (D. Conn. 2007); United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 
32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *18 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2006). These courts follow a 
suggestion from Justice Stevens’ dissent in Rapanos: 
 
It has been our practice in a case coming to us from a lower federal court to 
enter a judgment commanding that court to conduct any further proceedings 
pursuant to a specific mandate. That prior practice has, on occasion, made it 
necessary for Justices to join a judgment that did not conform to their own 
views. In these cases, however, while both the plurality and Justice Kennedy 
agree that there must be a remand for further proceedings, their respective 
opinions define different test to be applied on remand. Given that all four 
Justices who have joined this opinion would uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction in 
both of these cases--and in all other cases in which either the plurality’s or 
Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied--on remand each of the judgments should 
be reinstated if either of those tests is met.  
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plurality and significant nexus tests, choosing instead to apply 
their own precedent.89 Thus, the extent of the Corps’ wetlands 
jurisdiction remains unclear.90 
III. THE ILLOGIC OF THE PLURALITY TEST 
The plurality test presents a flawed approach to 
limiting the Corps’ jurisdiction for several reasons. First, the 
plurality test threatens to defeat the purposes of the CWA by 
excluding wetlands necessary to preserve water quality and 
produce natural products.91 Second, this test presents an 
implausible and self-contradicting construction of “waters of 
the United States.”92 Third, the plurality test misconstrues 
congressional intent and legislative history.93 Finally, the test 
misreads prior Supreme Court precedent, and it fails to accord 
agency deference.94 Most courts after Rapanos have disregarded 
the plurality test.95 This Section will discuss the illogic of this 
test and suggest that future courts also decline to accept the 
Rapanos plurality’s constructions of “waters of the United 
States” and adjacent wetlands. 
A. Environmental Effects of the Plurality Test 
The environmental implications of adopting the 
plurality test could be devastating. While natural wetlands 
continue to disappear and the realm of private property 
  
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2265 (footnotes omitted). But see King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 
783 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[W]e do not think we are free to combine a dissent with a 
concurrence to form a Marks majority.”). The King Court held that an opinion can only 
be regarded as “narrower” when it is a subset of broader opinions. Id. at 781. The First 
Circuit in Johnson, however, distinguished King because it noted that none of the tests 
from Rapanos were a subset of another test. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64 (“[The King 
Court’s] understanding of ‘narrowest grounds’ . . . does not translate easily to the 
present situation. The cases in which Justice Kennedy would limit federal jurisdiction 
are not a subsidy of the cases in which the plurality would limit jurisdiction.”).  
 89 See Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d 723 at 725; Chevron Pipe Line, 437 F. 
Supp. 2d at 613. 
 90 Charles Lane, Justices Rein in Clean Water Act; Still-Divided Court Leaves 
Reach of the Law Unclear, WASH. POST, June 20, 2006, at A1. 
 91 See infra Part III.A. 
 92 See infra Part III.B. 
 93 See infra Part III.C. 
 94 See infra Part III.D. 
 95 See infra Part III.E. 
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expands,96 the Corps may be unable to regulate several types of 
waters under this test. The plurality test forbids waters that 
are not “relatively permanent, standing, or flowing bodies” and 
wetlands lacking a “continuous surface connection” to “waters 
of the United States” from ever being considered “waters of the 
United States.”97 Waters falling outside the Corps’ jurisdiction 
would thus include intermittent streams, seasonal rivers, and 
periodically-dry river beds.98 Wetlands falling outside the 
Corps’ jurisdiction would include wetlands near, but not 
directly touching, a relatively permanent, standing, or flowing 
body of water.99 These natural features would then become 
unregulated candidates for development or the deposit of 
dredge due to one of two arbitrary facts: (1) water was not 
present for a sufficiently large number of days, or (2) the 
wetland was close, but not directly touching, “water of the 
United States.” Two polluters that cause the same amount of 
damage to the environment might face disparate degrees of 
liability based solely on a percentage of days or the proximity of 
a connection.100 Developers, polluters, and property owners 
would be encouraged to alter the nature of their property in 
order to exempt their lands from the Corps’ jurisdiction.101 
Plant and animal life forms that rely on intermittent bodies of 
water and non-continuous wetlands for subsistence would be 
forced to find other habitats or die off in the face of 
development.102 In essence, eco-systems would die.103 While 
  
 96 ZINN & COPELAND II, supra note 28. A FWS study estimated an annual 
loss of wetlands in the continental United States of 58,000 acres per year between 1986 
and 1997. Id. 
 97 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2221, 2224. 
 98 See id. at 2259-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 99 Id. at 2262. 
 100 In his dissent, Justice Stevens discusses a hypothetical stream that flows 
for 290 days of the year and another stream that flows for the entire year to illustrate 
that polluters in both streams could cause the same effect on downstream waters, 
while realizing disparate levels of liability under the plurality test. Id. (“Under the 
plurality’s view, then, the Corps can regulate polluters who dump dredge into a stream 
that flows year round but may not be able to regulate polluters who dump into a 
neighboring stream that flows for only 290 days of the year—even if the dredge in this 
second stream would have the same effect on downstream waters as the dredge in the 
year-round one.”). 
 101 For example, a developer could block the inundation of water onto his 
property in order to prevent it from including a relatively permanent, standing, or 
flowing body of water. This step would remove the Corps’ jurisdiction over the property, 
and thus allow the property owner to proceed with development. 
 102 What Are Wetlands?, supra note 11. Both aquatic and terrestrial creatures 
live on wetlands, and some species’ habitat depends upon whether the area consists of 
coastal or inland wetlands. Id. “Destruction of wetlands eliminates or severely 
minimizes their function and value. Drainage of wetlands prevents surface water 
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developers may argue the necessity of sacrifices to prevent the 
Corps from overreaching its authority, statistics indicate the 
Corps’ permit process is far from highly selective.104 In reality, 
the Corps denies less than 1% of fill permits.105 Finally, as 
Justice Stevens points out, the large investments necessary for 
such development show that the property owners affected by 
the Section 404 program106 are quite capable of lobbying their 
representatives for a change in congressional policy.107 The 
effects of the plurality test would work cruel and unnecessary 
destruction on the environment in the name of needlessly 
promoting economic development.108 Therefore, the 
environmental consequences of the plurality test suggest that a 
harsh standard for establishing the Corps’ jurisdiction would 
be inappropriate. 
B. The Plurality Test as a Matter of Statutory Construction 
The plurality test, as a matter of statutory construction, 
suffers from inconsistency and implausibility. The first holding 
of the plurality’s opinion—that “only relatively permanent, 
standing or flowing bodies of water” make up “waters of the 
United States”109—results from a thorough tour of the Webster’s 
New International Dictionary (“Webster’s Second”), which 
Scalia separately cites to define such ambiguous terms as “the,” 
“waters,” and “waters of the United States.”110 Somehow, Scalia 
  
storage and reduces their water quality enhancement function. Wetland filling does 
likewise as well as destroying vital habitats for native fish and wildlife species.” NWI 
Values of Wetlands for Flood and Storm Surge Attenuation, U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service, http://www.fws.gov/nwi/stormvalues.htm. 
 103 What Are Wetlands?, supra note 11; see also U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 
National Wetlands Inventory: Developing and Providing Wetlands Information, 
http://www.fws.gov/fisheries/CD/Programs/National_Wetlands_Inventory.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2007) (noting the ecological and economic importance of preserving 
wetlands as eco-systems). For further information on eco-systems, see discussion supra 
note 11. 
 104 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATERS AND WETLANDS: CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS NEEDS TO EVALUATE ITS DISTRICT OFFICE PRACTICES IN DETERMINING 
JURISDICTION 8 (GAO-04-297, 2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04297.pdf. 
 105 In 2002, for example, the Corps denied 128 Section 404 permits out of 
85,445 applications. Id.  
 106 The Section 404 program is the process employed by the Corps to issue 
permits under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. ZINN & COPELAND I, supra note 27, 
at 2. 
 107 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2259 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 108 See id. 
 109 Id. at 2221 (plurality opinion).  
 110 Id. at 2220. 
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concludes that the use of the definite article “the” and the 
plural version of “waters” links the terms of 33 U.S.C. § 1311 
with the definitions in Webster’s Second, which refer to water 
“[a]s found in streams and bodies forming geographical 
features such as oceans, rivers, and lakes” or “the flowing or 
moving masses, as of waves or flood, making up such streams 
or bodies.”111 Next, Justice Scalia takes the awkward step of 
equating the preceding definitions with his own requirement of 
“relatively permanent, standing, or flowing” water without 
  
 111 Id. Justice Scalia continued: 
 
The Corps’ expansive approach might be arguable if the CSA [sic] defined 
‘navigable waters’ as ‘water of the United States.’ But ‘the waters of the 
United States’ is something else. The use of the definite article (‘the’) and the 
plural number (‘waters’) show plainly that § 1362(7) does not refer to water in 
general. In this form, ‘the waters’ refers more narrowly to water ‘[a]s found in 
streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, 
[and] lakes,’ or ‘the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making 
up such streams or bodies.’ 
 
Id. (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter 
Webster’s Second]). Scalia’s distinction between “waters” and “water” would therefore 
remove the Corps’ jurisdiction from several types of natural features based on the 
presence of a single letter, when Congress’ express purposes and legislative history 
counsel for the opposite conclusion.  
  Further, Scalia supplies no reason for citing the Webster’s Second beyond 
his conclusion that it provides “the only natural definition of the term ‘waters.’” Id. at 
2220. Judging by his abandonment of Webster’s Second when he defines “adjacent 
wetlands,” Scalia must have chosen this source because it was most advantageous to 
support a conclusion he had already reached. Thus, the definitions of ‘waters’ cited by 
Scalia within Webster’s Second do not connote the significance of a controlling rule of 
law. 
  Finally, Webster’s Second’s definitions of “waters” provide inadequate 
support for Scalia’s conclusion. Even if “waters” refers to ‘[a]s found in streams and 
bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes” or “the flowing 
or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams or bodies,” these 
definitions do not mandate that waters be permanent, standing, or flowing bodies. Id. 
at 2220 (citing Webster’s Second). At most, these definitions connote that some waters 
have these qualities, but others may lack these qualities. Therefore, the plurality test’s 
first conclusion lacks support in the cited definitions.  
  One can only guess why Scalia attempts this strained construction of 
“waters,” and why the other three members of the plurality subscribe to it, when these 
Justices could have adopted the more obvious position: Congress intended to give the 
Corps broad discretion to define the Corps’ jurisdiction. A potential explanation can be 
given by a quote from Chief Justice Roberts’s brief concurring opinion: “[After 
SWANCC], the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless view of the scope of 
its power.” Id. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Roberts use of the words “essentially 
boundless” indicates an ideological belief, possibly held by other members of the 
plurality, that the Corps’ jurisdiction is too large, and must be reduced at all costs. If 
this belief is the real motivation behind the plurality’s “revisionist reading” of the 
CWA, the Court’s agency jurisprudence has taken a shameful turn beyond impartiality 
into ideology, and the Court is lucky this view does not command majority approval. Id. 
at 2255 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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defining any of these terms.112 Although Scalia points out that 
“[n]one of these terms encompasses transitory puddles or 
ephemeral flows of water,” the conclusion that all “waters of 
the United States” therefore must be relatively permanent 
lacks a logical basis.113 As Justice Stevens points out in his 
dissent, Webster’s Second says nothing about whether waters 
can be intermittent or ephemeral and yet be classified as 
“waters.”114 Therefore, the plurality test’s first element lacks 
foundation. 
In the second part of the plurality test—that “adjacent 
wetlands” must have a “continuous surface connection” to 
“waters of the United States”—Justice Scalia abandons the 
counsel of his “preferred” source, Webster’s Second, to read in 
an “amendment” to the CWA.115 Delving immediately into the 
case history of Riverside Bayview and SWANCC for foundation, 
Scalia fails to conduct any investigation on a linguistic 
meaning of “adjacent,” “wetlands,” or “adjacent wetlands.”116 
One potential reason for this omission might be the definition 
of “adjacent” in Webster’s Second, which defines “adjacent” as 
“nearby” or “close,” and explicitly states “[o]bjects are adjacent 
when they lie close to each other, but not necessarily in actual 
contact.”117 This definition squarely conflicts with any 
requirement of a connection. Under the Corps’ definition, 
“adjacent” means “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring,” and 
“adjacent wetlands” include non-contiguous wetlands.118 This 
  
 112 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220-21 (plurality opinion). 
 113 Id. at 2221. 
 114 Id. at 2260 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 115 Id. at 2226 (plurality opinion), construed in id. at 2262 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). By “amendment,” Stevens is referring to Scalia’s logic formulating the 
plurality test. In creating this test, Scalia devised a definition for two terms in the 
CWA. Thus, Scalia amended the CWA by promulgating these two definitions. See id. 
Stevens also notes that the two canonical principles that the plurality test relies 
upon—concern over intrusion on state power and constitutional avoidance—are 
inapplicable to the issue of adjacent wetlands. Id. at 2261. On the state power intrusion 
issue, “Congress found it ‘essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the 
source,’ and the Corps can define ‘waters’ broadly to accomplish this aim;” and on the 
constitutional avoidance issue, “[t]he wetlands in these cases are not ‘isolated’ but 
instead are adjacent to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters and play important 
roles in the watershed . . . .” Id. at 2261-62. 
 116 Id. at 2225-27 (plurality opinion).  
 117 Webster’s Second defines adjacent as “[l]ying near, close, or contiguous; 
neighboring; bordering on.” See id. at 2263 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Webster’s 
Second 32). 
 118 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (2006) (“Wetlands separated from other waters of the 
United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and 
the like are ‘adjacent wetlands.’”). 
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definition is both consistent with the delegation of authority in 
the CWA and other legal and nonlegal definitions of 
“adjacent.”119 Therefore, the plurality test’s requirement of a 
“continuous surface connection” implausibly fails to consider 
accepted definitions of “adjacent” and conflicts with the 
methods of construction used to construe “waters of the United 
States.” 
C. The Plurality Test Versus Congressional Intent and 
Legislative History 
The plurality test fails most, perhaps, in its attempt to 
reflect consistency with congressional intent. Congress made 
no mention of permanence, connections, or Webster’s Second 
when it promulgated § 1311 in 1972.120 At the time, Congress’ 
intent was to eliminate pollution and resolve the problems 
caused by the states’ failure to regulate their own programs.121 
The CWA, as a result, gave broad power to the federal 
government, allowing the Corps to define “waters of the United 
States.”122 In contrast, the plurality test’s interpretations of 
“waters of the United States” and “adjacent wetlands” would 
limit federal power and frustrate this intent.123 Moreover, the 
plurality test conflicts with Congress’ 1977 acquiescence.124 
While Scalia “ha[s] no idea whether the Members’ failure to act 
in 1977 was attributable to their belief that the Corps’ 
  
 119 See, e.g., Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2262 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Webster’s Second 32); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 44 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “adjacent” 
as “[l]ying near or close to, but not necessarily touching”). 
 120 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2000)). 
 121 S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 1-2 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 
3675-76. 
 122 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-500, § 404, 86 Stat. 816, 884 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000)).  
 123 By specifying that “waters of the United States” must be “relatively 
permanent, standing, or flowing” bodies and holding that adjacent wetlands must 
include a “continuous surface connection,” the plurality test specifically removes 
certain wetlands from the jurisdiction of the federal government. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 
at 2221, 2226. Ironically, this removal occurs against the explicit wishes of most state 
governments, as 33 states petitioned the Rapanos Court in support of the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision. Id. at 2224 n.8. 
 124 In 1977, Congress decided not to amend the CWA to reduce the Corps’ 
jurisdiction. H.R. REP. No. 95-139, at 54 (1977). By removing specific wetlands and 
waters from the Corps’ jurisdiction, the plurality test also works in contravention of the 
congressional intent, which this acquiescence conveys. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra Part II.C. 
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regulations were correct,”125 the congressional record indicates 
that the Corps’ jurisdiction was specifically debated and 
resolved in favor of an expansive definition.126 Therefore, the 
plurality test conflicts with both the legislative intent at the 
drafting and through the subsequent history of the CWA. 
D. The Plurality Test’s Treatment of Prior Supreme  
Court Precedent 
Similarly, the plurality test fails to properly interpret 
the prior case law on the Corps’ jurisdiction. Under Chevron, 
when congressional intent is ambiguous, courts must defer to 
an agency’s construction of a statute so long as the construction 
is reasonable.127 In Riverside Bayview, the Court applied agency 
deference to uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction over adjacent 
wetlands.128 The SWANCC Court, in contrast, denied the Corps 
agency deference because the intrastate, isolated nature of the 
land at issue “invoke[d] the outer limits of Congress’ power” 
under the Commerce Clause.129 The wetlands at issue in 
Rapanos, however, significantly differed from the gravel pit in 
SWANCC because the Rapanos wetlands held connections to 
various bodies of water, which directly affected interstate 
commerce.130 Therefore, upholding the Corps’ jurisdiction in 
  
 125 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2230. 
 126 123 CONG. REC. 39,209 (1977) (“[T]he conference bill retains the 
comprehensive jurisdiction over the Nation’s waters . . . .”). Specifically, the record 
shows that the 1977 House passed a bill limiting the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction to 
navigable-in-fact waters and their adjacent wetlands. See H.R. 3199, 95th Cong., at 80-
81, 102-04 (1977). Next, the Senate passed a bill that contained no redefinition. S. 
1952, 95th Cong., at 63-76 (1977). Finally, the record shows the Conference Committee 
of both houses adopted the Senate’s approach. 123 CONG. REC. 39,209 (1977) (“The 
solution presented in the Senate Bill was adopted with only minor changes.”). 
 127 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984). 
 128 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 138 (1985). 
 129 SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001). The Commerce Clause, in Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution, expressly gives Congress “power . . . [t]o regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 3. The SWANCC Court held, “[w]here an administrative interpretation of a statute 
invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress 
intended that result.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172. This court went on to explain that its 
requirement was derived from “[its] prudential desire not to needlessly reach 
constitutional issues and our assumption that Congress does not casually authorize 
administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional 
authority.” Id. at 172-73. 
 130 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2239. The District Court found that the 
Salzburg site had a surface water connection to “tributaries of the Kawkawlin River 
which, in turn, flows into the Saginaw River and ultimately into Lake Huron.” The 
Hines Road site connected to a drain that carried water into the Tittabawassee River, 
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Rapanos would not have raised the “significant constitutional 
questions”131 cited in SWANCC, and the Rapanos plurality 
should not have abrogated agency deference. 
1. The Plurality’s Misapplication of SWANCC 
Instead of recognizing the lack of “constitutional 
questions” in Rapanos, Scalia relied heavily on SWANCC to 
redefine “adjacent wetlands” under an inappropriate standard. 
In Scalia’s opinion, though disputed by several other courts, 
SWANCC held that adjacent wetlands directly abut “waters of 
the United States.”132 SWANCC, however, denied the Corps 
jurisdiction under a “heightened concern” evoked by 
“constitutional questions” relating to the isolated, intrastate 
lands at issue in that case.133 In contrast, the plurality in 
Rapanos did not consider any “constitutional questions” 
because the Rapanos wetlands were not isolated.134 The 
Rapanos plurality did, however, apply the same heightened 
concern of SWANCC to impose that Court’s construction of 
adjacent wetlands upon the Corps.135 As the SWANCC standard 
  
while the Pine River site’s wetlands connected through surface water to the Pine River 
and also flowed into Lake Huron. Id. at 2239. In Carabell, the property was separated 
by a man-made berm from a ditch that connected to a drain, which empties into a creek 
that empties into Lake St. Clair. Carabell v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 2d 917, 923 
(E.D. Mich. 2003). 
 131 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. 
 132 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2218. Most appellate courts have limited the 
holding of SWANCC to the intrastate, isolated land at issue in that case. Verchick, 
supra note 65. Further, while mentioning “wetlands that actually abutted on a 
navigable waterway” as one of three definitions for adjacent wetlands, the SWANCC 
court never required direct abutment as a condition precedent for adjacency. SWANCC, 
531 U.S. at 167. 
 133 SWANCC concerned pools created in abandoned sand and gravel pits 
where migratory birds nest. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. These pits, unlike the waters 
at issue in Rapanos, were wholly intrastate. See id. Thus, the land at issue in 
SWANCC evoked the outer limits of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause, 
causing the court to evaluate the Corps’ jurisdiction under a “heightened concern.” Id.; 
see also John D. Ostergren, SWANCC in Duck Country: Will Court-Ordered Devolution 
Fill the Prairie Potholes?, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 381, 396-99 (2003) (discussing the effect 
of SWANCC on federal jurisdiction over intrastate, non-navigable isolated wetlands). 
For a discussion on the scope of the Commerce Clause, see discussion supra note 59. 
 134 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2225. 
 135 Specifically, the court held that the Corps’ definition of “waters of the 
United States” was impermissible, under Chevron, and applied the direct abutment 
requirement of SWANCC, instead of deferring to the Corps. Id. The court’s conclusion 
that the definition was impermissible, however, is largely founded upon the court’s 
reading of Webster’s Second for the requirement of “relatively permanent, standing, or 
flowing bodies of water” and SWANCC for the requirement of a “direct surface 
connection.” Id. at 2221, 2224-25. Thus, the court renders an agency’s construction of a 
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was intended to address constitutionally invasive exercises of 
federal power and not all of the exercises of the Corps’ 
wetlands jurisdiction, the plurality’s use of SWANCC was 
improper. 
2. The Plurality’s Erroneous Distinction of  
Riverside Bayview 
In addition, the plurality erroneously distinguished 
Riverside Bayview. Riverside Bayview supported deferring to 
the Corps as long as its jurisdiction was reasonable and 
provided the controlling precedent on the central issue in 
Rapanos—adjacent wetlands.136 Arguing to the contrary, 
Justice Scalia held that Riverside Bayview was irrelevant 
because “the definition of tributaries was not at issue in that 
case.”137 Scalia’s logic, however, is misplaced. While tributaries 
were not at issue in Riverside Bayview, this fact is de minimus 
because this precedent was intended to apply to all wetlands, 
including those with a tributary connection to “waters of the 
United States.”138 In Rapanos, tributaries connected the 
wetlands at issue to “waters of the United States.”139 Therefore, 
Riverside Bayview provided the controlling precedent, and the 
plurality improperly distinguished this case. 140 
E. Post-Rapanos Courts Have Disregarded the  
Plurality Test 
Several lower courts have entirely snubbed the strict 
nature of the plurality test.141 These cases have either followed 
  
statute “impermissible” based on the weight of a dictionary and an irrelevant 
precedent. Id. at 2224. 
 136 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985). 
 137 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2229. 
 138 Id. at 2255 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 139 Id. at 2256-57. 
 140 Essentially, the test renders the determinations of Riverside Bayview and 
SWANCC insignificant by creating an entirely new standard that conflicts with the 
underlying premises of these cases. 
 141 N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that the “significant nexus” test “provides the controlling rule of 
law”); United States v. Cundiff, 480 F. Supp. 2d 940, 944 (W.D. Ky. 2007); United 
States v. Fabian, No. 2:02-CV-495, 2007 WL 1035078, at *15 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2007); 
Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 824 (N.D. Cal. 2007) 
(holding that satisfaction of the plurality test is “not necessary” for jurisdiction under 
the CWA); United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *19 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2006) (allowing the jurisdictional requirement to be met if either the 
plurality or “significant nexus” test was satisfied). An EPA administrative decision also 
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Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test142 as the controlling 
rule of law or awarded jurisdiction to the Corps if the property 
at issue met either the plurality or significant nexus tests’ 
criteria.143 As these decisions concerned the Corps’ wetlands 
jurisdiction, the unwillingness of these courts to apply the 
plurality test indicates the impracticality of categorically 
applying this standard. 
In conclusion, the plurality test consists of two arbitrary 
definitions,144 both of which lack consistency and foundation. 
These constructions fail to comport with congressional intent, 
subsequent legislative intent, both of the prior Supreme Court 
cases involving the subject matter at issue, and the 
environmental concerns expressed in thirty-three amici briefs, 
none of which advocated the plurality’s test.145 In addition, the 
test sharply contradicts the proper deference owed to the Corps 
under Chevron and Riverside Bayview.146 Moreover, the test 
would yield unnecessary and harsh environmental 
consequences, such as the arbitrary destruction of eco-systems 
and the death of plant and animal life.147 For these reasons and 
others, lower courts since Rapanos facing similar issues have 
  
recognized that the plurality test was “at odds with the [CWA’s] concern with 
downstream water quality.” In re J. Phillips Adams, No. CWA-10-2004-0156, 2006 EPA 
ALJ LEXIS 33, *71 (EPA Oct. 18, 2006). This tribunal employed Justice Kennedy’s 
significant nexus test to uphold CWA jurisdiction over the property at issue. Id. 
 142 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 143 N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999-1000; Cundiff, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 
944; Fabian, 2007 WL 1035078, at *15; Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 824; 
Evans, 2006 WL 2221629, at *19. 
 144 The first part of the plurality test states “‘waters of the United States’ 
include only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water.” Rapanos, 126 
S. Ct. at 2221. The second part of the plurality test states “the phrase ‘the waters of the 
United States’ includes only those relatively permanent, standing or continuously 
flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features’ that are described in ordinary 
parlance as ‘streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’” Id. at 2225 (citing Webster’s 
Second, at 2882). 
 145 Id. at 2224 n.8; id. at 2259 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting (“[T]he Corps’ 
approach has the overwhelming endorsement of numerous amici curiae, including 33 
States . . . .”). An amicus curiae is an entity “who is not a party to a lawsuit but who 
petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a brief in the action because that 
person has a strong interest in the subject matter.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (8th 
ed. 2004). 
 146 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138-39 
(1985). The Riverside Bayview Court held the Corps’ construction of the CWA 
interpreting “waters of the United States” to include adjacent wetlands was 
reasonable, and therefore permissible under Chevron. Id. 
 147 As discussed above, the arbitrary nature of the plurality test’s two 
requirements would categorically exclude certain wetlands, and force plants and 
animals depending on these lands to either die off or relocate. See discussion supra 
Part III.A. Further, this result is unnecessarily harsh because the Corps only denies 
1% of permits. Id. 
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sidestepped or avoided the plurality test.148 This Note argues 
that courts should continue to disregard the plurality test as an 
implausible, inconsistent standard, which fails to accord 
appropriate deference to legislative intent, prior case law, the 
views of state governments, or the Corps’ judgment. 
IV. AN EXAMINATION OF THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST 
The significant nexus test, already the most frequently 
applied standard of the Corps’ jurisdiction in the post-Rapanos 
era,149 is likely to be the most influential test deriving from 
Rapanos. This test requires that property exhibit a “significant 
nexus” between the wetlands at issue and navigable-in-fact 
waters for the Corps to have jurisdiction.150 This nexus is 
“assessed in terms of the statute’s goals and purposes,” as 
outlined in 33 U.S.C. § 1251.151 For the nexus to exist, either 
the wetlands or a combination of the wetlands and surrounding 
lands must “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity” of navigable-in-fact waters.152 Justice 
Kennedy further notes that wetlands whose effects on water 
quality are “speculative” or “insubstantial” fall outside the 
Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction.153 On its face, the significant 
nexus test may seem reasonable through its balancing of 
interests and respect for both congressional intent and prior 
case law. This test, however, is far from the most logical or 
  
 148 E.g., N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999-1000; United States v. Johnson, 
467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2006) (suggesting that on remand the district court could base 
jurisdiction on either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s standard); Fabian, 2007 WL 
1035078, at *15; Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 824; Evans, 2006 WL 
2221629, at *19; United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex. 
2006).  
 149 Since Rapanos, two courts have disregarded the Rapanos decision. See 
Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 725; Chevron Pipe Line, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 613. Other 
courts addressing this issue have either applied the “significant nexus” test, as the 
narrowest grounds of the Rapanos holding, or allowed the Corps jurisdiction if the 
wetlands at issue met either the plurality or “significant nexus” test. See Fabian, 2007 
WL 1035078, at *15; Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 824; Evans, 2006 WL 
2221629, at *19; N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999-1000; Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63-
64. 
 150 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Consistent with 
SWANCC and Riverside Bayview and with the need to give the term ‘navigable’ some 
meaning, the Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a 
significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the 
traditional sense.”). 
 151 Id.  
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
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proper one due to its incredible ambiguity and the 
complications it creates for both government enforcement and 
private property owners in the permit process. 
A. The History of the Significant Nexus Test 
The significant nexus test originated in Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion in SWANCC.154 The Riverside Bayview 
Court failed to mention the term “significant nexus” and 
concluded that the Corps’ jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands 
was reasonable under agency deference.155 In SWANCC, 
however, Justice Rehnquist noted that “[i]t was the significant 
nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that 
informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview.”156 This 
“significant nexus” was one of three potential definitions of the 
requisite link suggested by the SWANCC Court, which never 
decided upon one definition.157 Therefore, as read by SWANCC, 
the significant nexus of the property at issue in Riverside 
Bayview was a factor permitting that Court to hold that agency 
deference was appropriate.158 In contrast, the Court in 
SWANCC held that the property at issue lacked this nexus, but 
the Court’s holding did not turn on this determination.159 
Instead, the Court concluded that an expanded definition of 
“navigable waters” to include isolated ponds would rob the 
term “navigable” of any effect.160 Rehnquist also concluded that 
the constitutional questions generated by the property’s 
isolated, intrastate nature required a clear intent from 
  
 154 SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001). 
 155 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985). 
The Riverside Bayview Court recognized that agency deference, under Chevron, was 
the appropriate standard for evaluating the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction. Id. 
 156 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167. 
 157 Rehnquist described the requisite link in different parts of the opinion as 
“wetlands ‘inseparably bound up with the “waters” of the Unites States,’” “wetlands 
that actually abutted on a navigable waterway,” and wetlands possessing a “significant 
nexus” with navigable-in-fact waters. Id. at 165-67; see also Verchick, supra note 65, at 
865 (“In distinguishing Riverside [Bayview from] its current case, the SWANCC 
majority described ‘adjacent’ waters in various ways . . . . But however one defined the 
critical link to navigable waters, the Court was sure it was absent from those Illinois 
gravel pits.”). 
 158 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167. 
 159 Id. The Court’s determination, in fact, turned on the effect of the Migratory 
Bird Rule on “navigable waters” and the constitutional questions raised by the isolated, 
intrastate nature of the property at issue. Id. at 171-72. 
 160 Id. at 172 (“We cannot agree that Congress’ separate definitional use of the 
phrase ‘waters of the United States’ constitutes a basis for reading the term ‘navigable 
waters’ out of the statute.”). 
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Congress to uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction.161 Thus, the 
SWANCC holding rested on an unwillingness to misconstrue 
“navigable” and a belief that the property at issue in that case 
was invoking the outer limits of Congress’ power. 
Justice Kennedy created the significant nexus test out 
of a factor from SWANCC’s reading of Riverside Bayview.162 
These cases, however, relied on other factors to reach their 
conclusions. While Riverside Bayview rested on agency 
deference, SWANCC denied the Corps’ jurisdiction based on 
congressional intent and constitutional implications.163 In the 
following subsections, this Note will suggest the impropriety of 
the significant nexus test, due to its failures as a matter of 
congressional intent, ambiguity, and economic efficiency. 
B. The Significant Nexus Test Versus Congressional  
Intent and Legislative History 
The significant nexus test addresses the congressional 
intent examined in SWANCC and Riverside Bayview by 
requiring courts to assess the nexus in terms of the statute’s 
goals and purposes.164 Three questions, however, arise over 
whether this assessment is actually a furtherance of Congress’ 
intent. First, the test’s consideration of the CWA’s initial “goals 
and purposes” leaves no room for consideration of subsequent 
legislative history.165 Second, the test defeats Congress’ intent 
to provide broad federal regulatory authority because the test 
requires a “significant nexus” as a condition precedent to any 
  
 161 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172 (“Where an administrative interpretation of a 
statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that 
Congress intended that result.”). 
 162 Justice Kennedy introduces the concept of a “significant nexus,” without 
any context beyond stating its “[c]onsisten[cy] with SWANCC and Riverside Bayview 
and with the need to give the term ‘navigable’ some meaning.” Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 
2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The SWANCC Court’s reading of the Riverside Bayview 
opinion, however, was flawed, because Riverside Bayview upheld the Corps’ jurisdiction 
based on agency deference, and never mentioned the term “significant nexus.” United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138-39 (1985). Therefore, the 
“significant nexus” in Riverside Bayview was, at most, only a factor in that Court’s 
holding. 
 163 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171-72; see also Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 164 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The required nexus 
must be assessed in terms of the statute’s goals and purposes.”). 
 165 Id. Kennedy’s annunciation of the significant nexus test mentions that 
courts should consider the CWA’s goals and purposes, but does not mention whether 
the 1977 congressional acquiescence should be considered. Id. 
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consideration of congressional intent.166 Finally, the test 
misleads courts into disregarding the part of the test calling for 
an assessment of congressional intent.167 
Although the significant nexus test recognizes 
congressional intent, this test abandons consideration of the 
CWA’s legislative history. In CWA jurisprudence, the CWA’s 
legislative history is just as important as the initial goals and 
purposes of Congress.168 While Congress thoroughly considered 
the CWA before its enactment in 1972, the congressional 
acquiescence to the Corps’ jurisdiction in 1977 provided 
perhaps a more focused analysis on wetlands preservation.169 
Both houses debated proposals for a more limited Section 404 
jurisdiction,170 and the House passed a bill limiting the Corps’ 
jurisdiction, but the old definition was ultimately retained.171 
Without considering these deliberations, courts may ignore 
specific evidence of express congressional intent acknowledging 
the validity of the Corps’ interpretation of its jurisdiction.172 
Therefore, the absence of consideration for legislative history in 
the significant nexus test detracts from a court’s ability to 
  
 166 Id. (“The required nexus must be assessed in terms of the statute’s goals 
and purposes.”).  
 167 Though courts have implicitly followed congressional intent since Rapanos, 
the omission of any discussion of congressional intent within these decisions could 
prove troublesome. This omission would be troublesome because it might cause future 
courts to disregard the assessment of congressional intent, even though the significant 
nexus test explicitly calls for an assessment of this intent. See N. Cal. River Watch v. 
City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson, 
467 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Fabian, No. 2:02-CV-495, 2007 WL 
1035078, at *15 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2007); Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 
469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 824 (N.D. Cal. 2007); United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 
32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *21-22 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2006). 
 168 Congress’ intent through its 1977 acquiescence to the broader definition of 
the Corps’ jurisdiction should be just as important to a court’s analysis as Congress’ 
original intent behind the act. See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 137-38 (discussing 
the importance of the congressional acquiescence to the Corps).  
 169 See id. at 136-37 (discussing the congressional acquiescence after 
arguments were made for and against a narrower interpretation of jurisdiction). 
 170 Section 404 jurisdiction refers to the Corps’ jurisdiction to issue or deny 
permits to deposit dredge or fill material on “waters of the United States.” ZINN & 
COPELAND I, supra note 27, at 6. 
 171 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 137. The House bill would have narrowed 
the Corps’ jurisdiction to govern only wetlands that were navigable-in-fact. See H.R. 
3199, 95th Cong., at 80-81, 102-04 (1977). The Joint Conference Committee, however, 
retained the broad definition of jurisdiction, allowing the Corps to continue 
interpreting the CWA’s language—“waters of the United States.” See S. 1952, 95th 
Cong., at 63-76 (1977). 
 172 The 1977 congressional acquiescence to the Corps’ jurisdiction presents the 
only moment in CWA history when Congress has acknowledged with approval the 
Corps’ past interpretations of its jurisdiction. United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 
729 (3d Cir. 1993); Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 137-38.  
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analyze all the factors that may have contributed to Congress’ 
intent behind the CWA. 
The significant nexus test raises a second congressional 
intent issue concerning the worth of this intent when a 
significant nexus is a condition precedent.173 By requiring a 
significant nexus before any analysis of legislative intent, this 
test immediately imposes a burden on the Corps to prove that 
the lands at issue “significantly affect the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity” of navigable-in-fact waters.174 In 
contrast, the congressional “goals and purposes” that must be 
considered in light of the “significant nexus” support broad 
federal authority and seem to contradict any judicial 
requirement beyond the Corps’ obligation to reasonably 
construe the CWA.175 Therefore, Justice Kennedy’s test will 
consider congressional intent once the Corps has cleared a 
much higher hurdle than Congress intended.176 This procedure 
is far from a thorough and deferential evaluation of 
congressional intent. 
The third issue the significant nexus test presents is 
whether courts will erode the relevancy of congressional intent 
given its limited role in many of the lower court cases since 
Rapanos.177 To an extent, congressional intent has been 
mentioned and then quickly disregarded in the cases since 
Rapanos.178 As pointed out below, the lack of consideration for 
  
 173 “The required nexus must be assessed in terms of the statute’s goals and 
purposes.” Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This statement 
indicates that courts must first find the “significant nexus,” and then assess the nexus 
according to Congress’ intent behind the CWA. 
 174 Id. at 2248. 
 175 Congress evinced its intent that CWA jurisdiction be “the broadest possible 
constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which have been 
made or may be made for administrative purposes.” S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 144 (1972) 
(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3822. This broad interpretation of 
federal jurisdiction resulted from the failures of states to implement their own 
programs. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 1-2 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 
3675 (“[M]any states do not have approved standards. Officials are still working to 
establish relationships between pollutants and water uses. Time schedules for 
abatement are slipping away because of failure to enforce, lack of effluent controls, and 
disputes over Federal-State standards.”). 
 176 Id. 
 177 See N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th 
Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Fabian, No. 2:02-CV-495, 2007 WL 1035078, at *15 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2007); Envtl. 
Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 824 (N.D. Cal. 2007); United 
States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *21-22 (M.D. Fla. 
Aug. 2, 2006). 
 178 See N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999-1000 (briefly mentioning Justice 
Kennedy’s requirement to assess congressional goals and purpose, but failing to 
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congressional intent in these cases may be irrelevant because 
lower courts using the ambiguous significant nexus test have 
consistently supported Congress’ intent without explicit 
discussion.179 The omission of such discussion, however, could 
prove troublesome for congressional intent if future courts 
disregard the test’s assessment of goals and purposes 
completely and focus solely on the existence of a nexus.180 If 
such cases arose, courts would be deciding the Corps’ 
jurisdiction solely based on a scientific judgment, which the 
Corps is better equipped to make than a court.181 Therefore, the 
significant nexus test has led lower courts to briefly discuss 
congressional intent, but the brief nature of this discussion 
may cause future courts to abandon any consideration of this 
intent. 
C. The Ambiguity of the Significant Nexus Test 
A profound question surrounds the significant nexus 
test: What really is a “significant nexus?” Lower courts are now 
  
mention the CWA’s goals and purposes again); Johnson, 467 F.3d at 59 (discussing 
Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test and omitting any mention of assessing the 
goals and purposes of the Clean Water Act); Fabian, 2007 WL 1035078, at *15 (same); 
Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 824 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s test 
without referring to his assessment of congressional intent); Evans, 2006 WL 2221629, 
at *21-22. 
 179 N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999-1000 (upholding the Corps’ 
jurisdiction despite limited discussion of congressional intent); Fabian, 2007 WL 
1035078, at *15 (holding the wetlands at issue subject to the CWA despite brief 
discussion of congressional intent); Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 824 
(upholding CWA jurisdiction under Kennedy’s standard despite no mention of 
congressional intent); Evans, 2006 WL 2221629 at *23 (same). 
 180 Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 69-70 (1994). 
Judges are overburdened generalists, not philosophers or social scientists. 
Methods of interpretation that would be good for experts are not suitable for 
generalists. Generalists should be modest and simple. While recognizing that 
specialists might produce a more nuanced approach, generalists must see the 
process and error costs are much higher when they try to do the same thing.  
Id. If future courts disregard congressional intent, these courts would ignore an 
intended element of the significant nexus test, and reach their holdings based solely on 
a scientific judgment. This would be troublesome because experts are better at making 
scientific decisions than courts. Id. 
 181 The Corps is better equipped to make decisions concerning the existence of 
a nexus because the Corps’ day-to-day activities involve making scientific judgments, 
and because the Corps issues a manual defining which wetlands fall under its 
jurisdiction. See discussion infra Part IV.D; see also Easterbrook, supra note 180, at 69-
70. 
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asking this question, yet few reach a consistent definition.182 
Justice Kennedy explains that, in terms of wetlands, they must 
“significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity” of navigable-in-fact waters.183 Kennedy further allows 
establishment of a nexus for adjacent wetlands when the Corps 
can establish adjacency to navigable-in-fact waters.184 In the 
case of adjacency to non-navigable waters, however, “[a]bsent 
more specific regulations . . . the Corps must establish a 
significant nexus on a case-by-case basis.”185 While the Ninth 
Circuit found no trouble in holding that a man-made levee does 
not bar a significant nexus between a wetland and a river,186 a 
Texas District Court entirely dismissed the significant nexus 
test.187 The district court complained that Justice Kennedy 
failed to provide sufficient details to resolve the ambiguity of a 
“significant nexus.”188 Thus, there is great potential for 
disparate outcomes in the practical application of the 
significant nexus test. In addition, the ambiguity of the 
significant nexus test allows Justice Kennedy, its creator, to 
command a majority of the Supreme Court on any conclusion 
he reaches regarding the existence of a significant nexus.189 
  
 182 See N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 1000 (concluding that a pond held a 
significant nexus despite minimal discussion of the significant nexus test); Johnson, 
467 F.3d at 59 (discussing the ambiguous nature of the significant nexus test); United 
States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (“Because 
Justice Kennedy failed to elaborate on the ‘significant nexus’ required, this Court will 
look to the prior reasoning in this circuit.”).  
 183 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Beyond the subject 
of wetlands, the application of the significant nexus requirement to determine Corps 
jurisdiction is likewise unclear, because Kennedy fails to explain whether or not his 
test is an exception applicable only to wetlands. See id. at 2236-52. 
 184 Id. at 2249. 
 185 Id. 
 186 N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 1000. The facts in River Watch indicated 
several hydrologic connections between the waters at issue and “waters of the United 
States” despite the existence of the levee, so the Ninth Circuit had no trouble declaring 
the existence of a “significant nexus.” Id. Even this court, however, did not define 
“significant nexus.” See id. 
 187 Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d at 613. 
 188 Id. The court also stated its disapproval for the “significant nexus” test. Id. 
(“Justice Kennedy . . . advanced an ambiguous test—whether a ‘significant nexus’ 
exists to waters that are/were/might be navigable. This test leaves no guidance on how 
to implement its vague, subjective centerpiece. That is, exactly what is ‘significant’ and 
how is ‘nexus’ determined?”) (citations omitted). The court further stated, that 
“[b]ecause Justice Kennedy failed to elaborate on the ‘significant nexus’ required, this 
Court will look to the prior reasoning in this circuit.” Id. 
 189 This conclusion assumes that Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito 
will continue to adhere to the plurality test and that Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Souter will continue to adhere to the agency deference approach. On this 
issue, the Seventh Circuit commented, in most cases “any conclusion that Justice 
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Thus, on the Supreme Court at least, the ambiguity of the 
significant nexus test gives Justice Kennedy unitary power 
over most cases involving federal authority over wetlands.190 
Therefore, the ambiguity of the significant nexus test presents 
a challenge to its practical application. 
D. The Necessity and Cost Implications of the Significant 
Nexus Test 
The significant nexus test suffers further by creating 
the same standard as agency deference but with additional 
procedural hurdles.191 To its credit, the test reaches the same 
result as the plurality in Rapanos, while suggesting a more eco-
friendly standard for evaluating the Corps’ jurisdiction.192 As 
the plurality disapprovingly notes, however, “Justice Kennedy 
tips a wink at the agency, inviting it to try its same expansive 
reading again.”193 This “wink” means that, although the 
significant nexus test may be different in form from an agency 
deference approach, the practical results of employing the two 
tests will almost always be the same.194 In fact, nearly all of the 
lower courts applying the significant nexus test have 
  
Kennedy reaches [with respect to] federal authority over wetlands will command the 
support of five Justices.” United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 
(7th Cir. 2006). 
 190 The exception, as pointed out in Gerke, would occur in the case of a “slight 
surface hydrological connection,” allowing the Rapanos plurality and dissenters to vote 
to uphold federal jurisdiction, but the connection is too small for Justice Kennedy to 
consider that a “significant nexus” exists. Id. 
 191 The test is essentially the same standard as agency deference because most 
wetlands where the Corps’ jurisdiction would be reasonable also have a “significant 
nexus” to traditionally navigable waters. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Though “significant nexus” is an ambiguous term, most lower courts since 
Rapanos have upheld the Corps’ jurisdiction using this test. See N. Cal. River Watch, 
496 F.3d at 1000; United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Fabian, No. 2:02-CV-495, 2007 WL 1035078, at *15 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2007); 
United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *21-22 (M.D. 
Fla. Aug. 2, 2006). Justice Stevens further recognizes, “Justice Kennedy’s ‘significant 
nexus’ test will probably not do much to diminish the number of wetlands covered by 
the [CWA] in the long run.” Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 192 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While a more eco-
friendly standard than the plurality test is hardly an accomplishment, the significant 
nexus test does assess the goals and purposes of the CWA. See id. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). These goals and purposes include seeking “to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). 
 193 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2235 n.15 (plurality opinion). 
 194 Id. 
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eventually “deferred” to the Corps’ interpretation of the CWA.195 
Two practicalities, however, are different beyond the similar 
results in court holdings. First, the significant nexus test 
imposes additional costs for property owners who must assess 
their properties both in terms of the Corps’ regulations and 
under a new judicial standard.196 Second, the significant nexus 
test creates uncertainty for a property owner who either does 
not understand the meaning of “significant nexus” or does not 
know of the additional judicial definition.197  
The costs of hiring wetlands experts, known as 
hydrologists, to assess property will increase under the 
significant nexus test.198 Usually, a developer will consult such 
a hydrologist before filling a plot including potential wetlands 
in order to determine whether the wetlands meet the Corps’ 
existing regulations for jurisdiction.199 In Rapanos, the property 
owner asked a Michigan Department of Natural Resources 
inspector to look over the site and discuss the feasibility of 
  
 195 See N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 1000; Johnson, 467 F.3d at 59; United 
States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006); Fabian, 2007 WL 
1035078, at *15; Evans, 2006 WL 2221629, at *21-22. 
 196 Property owners must pay for experts to assess their lands to determine 
compliance with the Corps’ regulations, and then must pay for further assessments in 
the event they choose to challenge the Corps’ jurisdiction to deny their permits. 
 197 A property owner wishing to challenge the Corps’ jurisdiction to deny a 
permit cannot be expected to understand the judicially-constructed meaning for 
“significant nexus.” Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 198 If the significant nexus test becomes the standard for wetlands 
jurisdiction, property owners will be forced to further employ wetlands experts to 
evaluate the property for compliance with this additional test.  
 199 See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2006). A wetlands manual provided by the Corps 
further advises property owners of the following qualities that confer jurisdiction on 
the Corps:  
(1) prevalence of plant species typically adapted to saturated soil conditions, 
determined in accordance with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s 
National List of Plant Species that Occur in Wetlands;  
(2) hydric soil, meaning soil that is saturated, flooded, or ponded for sufficient 
time during the growing season to become anaerobic, or lacking in oxygen in 
the upper part; and  
(3) wetland hydrology, a term generally requiring continuous inundation or 
saturation to the surface during at least five percent of the growing season in 
most years. 
Wetlands Research Program Technical Report, Y-87-1, 9-10 (Jan. 1987), available at 
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/617377.html [hereinafter Technical Report]. These 
regulations provide precise, scientifically-determined definitions for the Corps’ exercise 
of jurisdiction. Therefore, these regulations provide adequate limits on the Corps’ 
jurisdiction, supply definitions capable of a lay person’s understanding, and should not 
be supplanted by a judicial construction like the significant nexus test. Rapanos, 126 S. 
Ct. at 2264 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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building a shopping center.200 The government also used an 
expert to testify at trial on the ecological functions of the 
wetlands at issue.201 Hydrologists are a necessary and 
indispensable part of any CWA case, but their work is not 
cheap.202 Instead of assisting the developers with this burden, 
however, the significant nexus test increases the burden by 
imposing additional work on the hydrologists.203 If, indeed, the 
significant nexus test is more than “a wink to the agency,” the 
hydrologist must first assess whether the property contains the 
applicable plant species, the soil, and inundation or saturation 
of water.204 The hydrologist must then assess whether the 
property significantly affects the chemical, physical, or 
biological integrity of navigable-in-fact waters.205 If this test is 
meant to reduce the burdens of overreaching jurisdiction by the 
federal government, it does so by burdening the individual 
property owner with higher costs of both wetlands experts and 
attorneys fees to make the necessary determinations.206 If, 
instead, the standard is meant to provide executive agencies 
with a workable definition of what they can regulate, the test 
again fails by imposing greater costs on the agencies to make 
these same determinations.207 As Justice Stevens points out, 
these costs are exactly what Riverside Bayview attempted to 
avoid.208 Therefore, the dual standard of the significant nexus 
  
 200 Id. at 2253. 
 201 Id. 
 202 The cost of hiring a hydrologist is comparable to the cost of hiring any 
other expert. For example, the Anoka Conservation District, a Minnesota non-
regulatory state government subdivision, provides “water monitoring services”  
to private landowners at costs ranging from $800 to $2700. Anoka Conservation 
District’s Services Guide for 2007: Routine Water Monitoring Services, 
http://www.anokaswcd.org/info/2007_fee_schedule.pdf. 
 203 Experts must additionally assess land to determine compliance with the 
significant nexus test, whereas they would otherwise assess wetlands based only on the 
standards in the Corps’ manual. See Technical Report, supra note 199. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 206 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Justice 
Kennedy’s approach will have the effect of creating additional work for all concerned 
parties.”); see also Easterbrook, supra note 180.  
 207 Agencies, such as the Corps, will have the same additional costs as 
property owners of hiring attorneys and wetlands experts to assess the additional 
implications of the significant nexus test’s requirements. For the Corps, this burden 
will be especially significant given its currently extensive involvement in several high-
profile projects. See discussion infra note 213. 
 208 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“And the Corps will 
have to make case-by-case . . . jurisdictional determinations, which will inevitably 
increase the time and resources spent processing permit applications. These problems 
are precisely the ones that Riverside Bayview’s deferential approach avoided.”). 
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test creates unnecessarily high costs for private property 
owners and the federal government that could be lowered by 
adhering to agency deference.209 
The significant nexus test also adds greater uncertainty 
to the permit process for both property owners and the Corps. 
The Corps’ definitions manual is extensive but not legal.210 This 
allows a curious property owner to decipher its language as he 
chooses. In contrast, the significant nexus test proposes a legal 
standard for evaluating federal jurisdiction over wetlands, 
which would prevent or at least make it difficult for a 
layperson to discover on his own whether his property includes 
wetlands.211 In addition, this test adds to both sides the 
uncertainty of increased litigation.212 If the significant nexus 
test is, in substance, the same as agency deference, why 
provide property owners an added incentive to take these 
matters to court under an illusory hope the Corps will be 
unable to prove a “significant nexus?” From the Corps’ 
perspective, the significant nexus test burdens a government 
agency, which is already overburdened in other areas, with 
increased litigation.213 Thus, the additional costs and 
  
 209 The significant nexus test creates both additional litigation and expert fees 
that would not be incurred with the agency deference approach. See discussion infra 
Part V.B. In addition, there are further process and error costs associated with 
increased judicial determinations. See Easterbrook, supra note 180. 
 210 The Corps issues this manual to provide guidance to property owners on 
the terms of 33 C.F.R. § 328.3. See Technical Report supra note 199. 
 211 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Developers wishing 
to fill wetlands adjacent to ephemeral or intermittent tributaries of traditionally 
navigable waters will have no certain way of knowing whether they need to get § 404 
permits or not.”). 
 212 With agency deference, the outcome would be more certain because the 
Corps’ jurisdiction would be upheld, so long as its construction of the CWA was 
reasonable. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985). 
 213 The Corps has recently taken significant stakes in the rebuilding efforts 
within Iraq and Afghanistan, and the clean-up after Hurricane Katrina. While the  
cost of litigation is unlikely to make a difference in these areas, the costs incurred  
by litigation could always be used to assist with other projects in the absence of  
the litigation. See generally Press Release, Gerry J. Gilmore, American Forces  
Press Service, U.S. General: Afghan Road, Electricity Projects Move Ahead, Oct. 18, 
2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=1676 (discussing the 
Corps’ $170 million investment in construction of infrastructure within Afghanistan); 
Press Release, Norris Jones, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs., Baghdad Counts on Local 
Improvements, Dec. 4, 2006, http://www.grd.usace.army.mil/news/releases/NR06-12-
04.html (discussing 150 projects worth $500 million in Iraq for which the Corps 
provides oversight); Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press 
Briefing on Gulf Coast Rebuilding, Aug. 22, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2006/08/20060822-5.html (officials from the Office of Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 
FEMA, and the Corps discussing the rebuilding costs for parts of Louisiana and 
Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina). 
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uncertainty associated with the significant nexus test suggest 
courts should rethink using this test. 
E. Post-Rapanos Judicial Treatment of the Significant 
Nexus Test 
The significant nexus standard will control future cases 
unless a new standard is enunciated. As Justice Kennedy will 
submit the fifth and deciding vote on most Supreme Court 
cases involving wetlands jurisdiction, the only wetlands over 
which this justice will not provide the controlling rule of law 
will be: (1) all continuous, yet slight, surface connections to 
navigable waters214 and (2) Justice Kennedy’s own property.215 
As Justice Stevens notes, and as subsequent lower courts’ 
opinions have shown, the practical results to the environment 
and the litigants of the significant nexus test are negligible in 
comparison with an agency deference approach.216 The costs 
and uncertainty that follow as a necessary result of the test’s 
ambiguity, however, create powerful arguments against the 
test’s merit.217 Therefore, the significant nexus test may be the 
present standard for federal wetlands authority, but the 
additional costs and uncertainty this test creates suggest 
agency deference could more efficiently accomplish the same 
results. 
V. THE AGENCY DEFERENCE APPROACH 
Agency deference is the most appropriate standard for 
CWA jurisdiction. In Chevron, the Supreme Court recognized 
that cases concerning administrative agencies establish 
principles of law in areas where judges are not typically 
experts.218 Thus, courts must defer to the agency’s construction 
of a statute when that construction is reasonable.219 This 
  
 214 United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 215 One would hope Justice Kennedy would choose to recuse himself if such a 
matter arose. 
 216 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Justice Kennedy’s 
‘significant nexus’ test will probably not do much to diminish the number of wetlands 
covered by the Act in the long run.”). 
 217 See discussion supra Part IV.D. 
 218 See Rapanos v. United States, 376 F.3d 629, 640 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 219 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
The Court instructed: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
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interpretation of agency jurisprudence was not present when 
the CWA was passed in 1972.220 The Riverside Bayview and 
SWANCC decisions, however, each recognize the importance of 
this mechanism.221 Moreover, deference makes economic sense, 
saving time and money that would be unnecessarily wasted on 
a judicial inquiry into a matter best reserved to experts in the 
particular field.222 Although skeptics argue that deference gives 
too much authority to agencies and opens the door to the 
possibility of overreaching, several checks, including judicial 
intervention when an agency’s interpretation is unreasonable, 
prevent these fears from reaching fruition.223 Therefore, agency 
deference should be applied to the exclusion of the plurality 
and significant nexus tests in cases concerning federal 
authority over wetlands. 
A. The History of the Agency Deference Approach 
Since the inception of administrative agencies in the 
late nineteenth century, courts have deferred to agencies’ 
  
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court 
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, 
the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as 
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. 
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, 
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.  
Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted). 
 220 Chevron was decided in 1984. Id. 
 221 The Riverside Bayview Court reached its holding based on agency 
deference. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985). 
The SWANCC Court recognized that agency deference would normally be the standard 
of review for the Corps’ jurisdiction, if not for the “heightened concern” resulting from 
the “constitutional questions” in that case. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001). 
 222 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
In view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the 
[CWA] itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to 
regulable waters, the Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship 
between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a 
legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the 
[CWA].  
United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 729 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Easterbrook, supra 
note 180. The judicial inquiry would be unnecessarily wasted because the same 
result—upholding the Corps’ jurisdiction—could be reached simply by deferring to the 
Corps’ jurisdiction. Under the agency deference approach, property owners could also 
avoid uncertainty over whether the CWA gave the Corps’ jurisdiction over their land. 
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a more detailed discussion, 
see infra Part V.B. 
 223 Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 729. 
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constructions of their statutory authority.224 In Chevron, the 
Supreme Court noted the weight of these holdings, especially 
when the regulatory interpretation at issue was considered 
ambiguous.225 The Chevron Court then applied this precedent to 
formulate a test: when a statute is “silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”226 Courts that follow this position 
recognize that judges are ill-equipped to issue policy-related 
statutory definitions and to trust the elaborate system of 
checks and balances that govern executive agencies.227 This is 
the case because the federal government’s executive branch is 
directly accountable to the public, while the agency is not.228 
Since Chevron, courts have widely followed the Supreme 
Court’s approach to agency interpretations of federal statutes 
  
 224 Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331 (1896). The Webster Court, for example, 
stated,  
The practical construction given to an act of Congress, fairly susceptible of 
different constructions, by one of the Executive Departments of the 
government, is always entitled to the highest respect, and in doubtful cases 
should be followed by the courts, especially when important interests have 
grown up under the practice adopted.  
Id. at 342. The Supreme Court also noted the deference owed to administrative 
agencies in several other decisions before Chevron. See FEC v. Democratic Senatorial 
Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1981) (“The interpretation put on the statute by 
the agency charged with administering it is entitled to deference.”); NLRB v. Brown, 
380 U.S. 278, 292 (1965) (“Of course due deference is to be rendered to agency 
determinations of fact, so long as there is substantial evidence to be found in the record 
as a whole.”); Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16 (1932) (“The familiar 
principle is invoked that great weight is attached to the construction consistently given 
to a statute by the executive department charged with its administration.”). 
 225 Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 843. On this issue, the Chevron Court 
remarked, “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and 
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional 
intent.” Id. at 843 n.9. 
 226 Id. at 843. 
 227 Verchick, supra note 65, at 861 (suggesting that agencies interpreting law 
for a national program should favor their own views “over that of a single district or 
appellate court”). 
 228 “Presidential control also leads to better political accountability.” Verchick, 
supra note 65, at 857. Additionally,  
Any president is likely to seek assurance that an unwieldy federal 
bureaucracy conforms its actions to his or her basic principles. Any president 
is likely to be concerned about excessive public and private costs. And any 
president is likely to want to be able to coordinate agency activity so as to 
ensure consistency and coherence . . . . 
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 16 (1995), quoted in Verchick, supra note 65, at 855. 
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and have referred to agency deference as Chevron deference.229 
Thus, an agency’s constructions of the CWA still need only be 
“rational” to be permissible.230 
Since the adoption of the CWA, several Supreme Court 
justices have employed agency deference to reach their 
holdings. Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council provides one of the first post-
Chevron examples of agency deference used in connection with 
the CWA.231 Upholding the EPA’s jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court held that an agency’s construction of the CWA need not 
be the most permissible, but rather sufficiently rational to 
prevent a court from substituting its judgment for that of the 
agency.232  
Next, Riverside Bayview became the first Supreme 
Court case to use agency deference to address the Corps’ 
authority over wetlands.233 Courts have described the CWA as 
“very complex.”234 These same courts, however, recognized that 
agencies held broad jurisdiction under the CWA.235 Again 
upholding an agency’s jurisdiction, the Riverside Bayview 
Court held that the Corps’ definition of navigable waters was 
reasonable as applied to adjacent wetlands.236 In the process, 
  
 229 Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. County Comm’rs of Carroll County, Md., 268 F.3d 
255, 267 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying agency deference to the EPA’s interpretation of the 
CWA); Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 729-30 (deferring to the Corps’ construction of “water” 
within the CWA); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (holding that 
the EPA’s understanding of the CWA is entitled to “considerable deference”); Train v. 
NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 75, 87 (1975) (deferring to the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean 
Air Act). 
 230 Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 267; Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 729; Chem. 
Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125. 
 231 Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125. In this case, an EPA practice of issuing 
fundamentally different factor variances, a practice on which congressional intent had 
been silent, was challenged as exceeding the limits of its jurisdiction under the Clean 
Water Act. Id. at 124. 
 232 Id. at 125. 
This view of the agency charged with administering the statute is entitled to 
considerable deference . . . to sustain it, we need not find that it is the only 
permissible construction that EPA might have adopted but only that EPA’s 
understanding of this very “complex statute” is a sufficiently rational one to 
preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of EPA. 
Id. 
 233 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985). 
 234 Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 267; Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 729; Chem. 
Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125. 
 235 Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 267; Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 729; Chem. 
Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125.  
 236 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 139. 
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the Court recognized that its review was “limited” by Chevron, 
especially when express congressional intent counseled 
deference to the Corps.237 The Riverside Bayview Court’s use of 
agency deference also indicates that such deference is 
necessary to preserve the Corps’ authority to interpret the 
CWA, as this approach is the only position advocated in 
Rapanos that allows courts to assess legislative history.238 
Subsequently, several lower courts deferred to the Corps’ 
wetlands jurisdiction under the CWA.239 Therefore, the history 
of agency deference indicates that this approach was the 
standard for assessing wetlands jurisdiction before Rapanos. 
B. The Cost Implications of the Agency Deference Approach 
The Corps’ wetlands manual provides the most efficient 
method for determining CWA coverage in most cases. 240 This 
manual includes a test—focusing on the present plant species, 
the qualities of the soil, and the specific water connections 
involved with the lands at issue—that provides a reasonable 
method for determining which lands are covered without 
additional litigation costs.241 Moreover, this test is 
understandable to a layperson and therefore promotes both 
efficiency and resource allocation.242 One may argue that a 
  
 237 Id. at 131 (“An agency’s construction of a statute it is charged with 
enforcing is entitled to deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict with the 
expressed intent of Congress. Accordingly, our review is limited to the question 
whether it is reasonable, in light of the language, policies, and legislative history of the 
[CWA] for the Corps to exercise jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 238 Id. at 131-32. This Court recognized that an agency may look to underlying 
policies of its statutory grant and legislative history in arriving at a reasonable 
construction of its jurisdiction. Therefore, legislative history can be used to assess an 
agency’s jurisdiction under the agency deference approach, but not under either the 
plurality or significant nexus tests. Because the congressional acquiescence to the 
broader definition of the Corps’ jurisdiction provides unique evidence of express 
congressional intent, the agency deference approach becomes a necessity to preserving 
the Corps’ intended jurisdiction. Id. at 132.  
 239 United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 708 (4th Cir. 2003) (using agency 
deference to uphold the Corps CWA jurisdiction); Baccarat Fremont Developers, LLC v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 425 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) (employing the 
Riverside Bayview Court’s test of an “adequate basis” for the Corps’ legislative 
construction). 
 240 See Technical Report, supra note 199. 
 241 Id. 
 242 By using terms such as “prevalence of plant species,” “saturated soil,” and 
“wetland hydrology,” as opposed to “significant nexus,” the Corps’ wetlands manual 
provides a definition of its jurisdiction to property owners in terms that can be 
understood by a layperson. In contrast, the term “significant nexus” is a judicially-
crafted term, which no court has precisely defined. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Since the property owner is better informed under agency 
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property owner who wishes to determine the CWA’s 
applicability to his land faces the fees from consulting wetlands 
experts and attorneys, regardless of which test a court may 
apply.243 The Corps’ manual, however, provides property owners 
with a definite idea of wetlands for which the Corps can 
regulate development, thereby reducing the risk that a 
property owner will make an uninformed decision to expend 
time and money.244 If courts adopt an additional judicial test, 
the Corps’ manual will lose this function, and property owners 
will have to pay for additional wetlands assessments and 
attorneys costs out of the resulting uncertainty from the 
additional test.245 Therefore, the agency deference approach is 
the most preferable standard from an economic perspective 
because it minimizes property owners’ costs and provides them 
with certainty over which wetlands are regulated. 
C. The Existence of Adequate Checks and Balances 
In addition to the Corps’ existing test within the 
wetlands manual, there are other checks on the Corps’ 
authority. First, one might question whether the Corps 
jurisdiction is even a controversial issue, as the Corps approves 
more than 99% of approximately 85,000 permits submitted.246 
  
deference, logical extension suggests the property owner will allocate his resources in a 
more efficient manner under this approach than under an additional judicial test, 
where additional factors create uncertainty about the wetlands manual’s definition of 
the Corps’ jurisdiction. 
 243 The argument would be that a property owner must still consult wetlands 
experts and attorneys regardless of which test the court applies for the Corps’ 
jurisdiction. 
 244 Technical Report, supra note 199. By focusing on the present plant species, 
the qualities of the soil, and the specific water connections involved with the lands at 
issue, the wetlands manual uses terms that property owners can understand, thereby 
giving them a definite idea of which wetlands are regulated. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 
2264 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 245 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In order to 
learn whether his property had a “significant nexus” to navigable-in-fact waters, a 
property owner would have to retain an attorney, incurring significant costs. See Wal-
Mart Watch—Battle-Mart: Hiring an Expert, http://walmartwatch.com/battlemart/ 
go/cat/expert__testimony__whistleblower (last visited Nov. 11, 2007) (“Land use 
attorneys can cost more than $275 per hour.”). In addition, a property owner would also 
need to retain a wetlands expert, also known as a hydrologist, to evaluate the property 
and to determine the existence of a significant nexus. Id.; see also discussion supra note 
203. 
 246 See ZINN & COPELAND I, supra note 27, at 7. The Corps authorizes about 
90% of these permits under a general permit where the Corps estimates the proposed 
activity to have a minor impact. About 9% of these permits undergo a more detailed 
evaluation, but the Corps usually denies only about 0.3% of total permits. Property 
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Moreover, the EPA holds a veto power over every proposed 
Corps permit, enabling the Agency to block any decision that 
may result in jurisdictional overreach.247 Some commentators 
claim the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and other agencies 
also hold unofficial veto powers over the Corps’ decisions and 
exercise them through threats of delay.248 Structurally, 
executive agencies are accountable to the executive branch, 
which is accountable to the political system.249 Finally, 
executive agencies also hold a duty of loyalty to Congress, 
which creates laws and delegates authority to agencies.250 If 
judicial tests and statutory constructions interfere with this 
delicate system of checks and balances, courts may frustrate 
the original goals of the CWA and its broad federal authority to 
ensure comprehensive environmental legislation.251 Further, 
existing restrictions placed on executive agencies by the 
political system, the executive, and fellow environmental 
agencies already provide oversight for the Corps’ jurisdiction.252 
Therefore, adequate checks and balances suggest that courts 
should adopt the agency deference approach with respect to 
federal authority over wetlands. 
  
owners typically withdraw approximately 5% of applications prior to permit decisions. 
Id. 
 247 See id. at 7. The EPA, the only federal agency with a veto power over the 
Corps’ permitting decisions, has used its veto power 11 times over the CWA’s thirty-
year history. Id. 
 248 See id. The Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton Administrations 
attempted to reduce these unofficial veto powers in order to expedite the Section 404 
program, but some critics claim these attempts did not completely fix the problems. Id. 
 249 Verchick, supra note 65, at 857; see also Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2347 (2001) (discussing the intricacies of 
agency’s relationships with Congress, the President, and the judicial branch). In 
addition, Congress in 1996 passed the Congressional Review Act (CRA), requiring 
agencies promulgating most new rules to submit a report and a copy of the rule to each 
House of Congress. Both houses then have the authority to disapprove a rule, even if 
the rule has already gone into effect. For a detailed discussion of the CRA and its 
legislative history, see generally Morton Rosenberg, Whatever Happened to 
Congressional Review of Administrative Rulemaking?: A Brief Overview, Assessment, 
and Proposal for Reform, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1051 (1999). 
 250 See supra note 249. 
 251 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000). The statute states that the purposes of the CWA 
are “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.” Id. These goals would be frustrated by additional judicial tests, which 
impede on the Corps’ authority to restore and maintain these waters. Rapanos, 126 S. 
Ct. at 2264 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 252 See Verchick, supra note 65, at 857; ZINN & COPELAND I, supra note 27,  
at 7. 
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D. Environmental Effects of the Agency Deference Approach 
Agency deference is also a superior standard from an 
environmental policy perspective. This approach’s greatest 
benefit to the environment is that it places most decisions 
regarding environmental policy in the hands of the agency best 
qualified to make the decisions.253 Thus, when a court assesses 
an environmental agency’s interpretation of its governing 
statute, the agency deference approach commands courts to 
defer to the decision of the Corps, the EPA or the FWS, so long 
as the decision is reasonable.254 In general, executive agencies 
receive this deference because they benefit from scientific 
expertise with respect to practical functions, like reducing 
discharges of pollutants and preventing groundwater 
contamination.255 The Corps has technical experience and 
access to resources that no other agency or body of government 
possesses, allowing it to make informed decisions about 
environmental issues.256 In contrast, the Supreme Court rarely 
hears cases involving environmental law or the Corps’ 
jurisdiction.257 Thus, the Corps, not courts, should be the 
primary decision-makers on issues of environmental policy, 
such as those issues involved with the Section 404 program.258 
When the Corps’ jurisdiction is left as broad as possible under 
the agency deference approach, fewer wetlands are 
  
 253 By deferring to the agency’s construction of a statute when its construction 
is reasonable, courts allow agencies to make decisions based on their scientific 
expertise. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1984); see also 
Easterbrook, supra note 180, at 69-70 (discussing the inappropriateness of judges 
deciding matters of scientific judgment). 
 254 See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n. v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985); United States 
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-
43; Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 75, 87 (1975); Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. County 
Comm’rs of Carroll County, MD, 268 F.3d 255, 267 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 255 Verchick, supra note 65, at 862-63.  
The scientific expertise within the EPA and the Army Corps justifies, in part, 
Congress’ [sic] decision to delegate administrative powers to those agencies. 
The courts have also acknowledged the specialized expertise of many 
agencies and have cited such expertise as a basis for deferring to 
administrative judgments when cases are close. 
Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Rapanos was the only case on the Court’s 2006 docket involving 
environmental law or the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2208. 
Further, the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction has only arisen before the Supreme Court 
three times in the CWA’s thirty-year history. See id. See generally SWANCC, 531 U.S. 
159 (2001); Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121. 
 258 United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 729 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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categorically excluded from the Corps’ jurisdiction, and the 
Corps considers more permits on a case-by-case basis.259 
Considering that most scientifically qualified agencies on 
environmental issues make most of the jurisdictional decisions 
under the agency deference approach, this approach is the 
superior standard for courts to review the Corps’ wetlands 
jurisdiction from an environmental policy perspective. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The logic behind a proper approach to judicial 
assessment of the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction is not as 
complicated as the sharp divisions within the Rapanos Court 
seem to indicate. The plurality test presents an implausible, 
inconsistent, and revisionist reading of the CWA’s history. This 
test categorically excludes classes of wetlands and likely will 
not gain widespread approval from lower courts.260 The 
significant nexus test is an intermediate standard that most 
courts now apply, but the ambiguous mechanics of this test 
create uncertainty and fail to ultimately constrain the Corps’ 
jurisdiction.261 In contrast, the agency deference approach is a 
standard that has worked for thirty years, reduces uncertainty, 
leaves adequate checks and balances in place, and allows more 
environmental decisions to be made by the most scientifically 
qualified body.262 The Corps in Rapanos reasonably construed 
the CWA; therefore, the Court should have deferred to its 
construction and upheld jurisdiction. Likewise, future courts 
should return to evaluating the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction 
under the agency deference approach without employing 
additional judicial tests. 
Brandon C. Smith† 
  
 259 This assertion is supported by the logical extension that the agency 
deference approach would not categorically exclude wetlands failing to possess a 
“significant nexus,” a “continuous surface connection” to “waters of the United States,” 
or “relatively permanent, standing, or flowing bodies of water.” Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 
2221, 2224, 2248. 
 260 See discussion supra Part III. 
 261 See discussion supra Part IV. 
 262 See discussion supra Part V. 
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